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This paper explores the implications of Uni￿ed Growth Theory for the origins of existing di⁄er-
ences in income per capita across countries. The theory sheds light on three fundamental layers of
comparative development. It identi￿es the factors that have governed the pace of the transition
from stagnation to growth and have thus contributed to contemporary variation in economic devel-
opment. It uncovers the forces that have sparked the emergence of multiple growth regimes and
convergence clubs, and it underlines the persistent e⁄ects that variations in pre-historical biogeo-
graphical conditions have generated on the composition of human capital and economic development
across the globe.
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1 Introduction
The transition from an epoch of Malthusian stagnation to a state of sustained economic growth and the
associated divergence in income per capita across the globe have been the subject of intensive research
in the growth literature in recent years.1 The inconsistency of exogenous and endogenous growth models
with some of the most fundamental features of the growth process has led to the development of a uni￿ed
theory of economic growth that captures in a single framework the epoch of Malthusian stagnation that
characterized most of human history, the contemporary era of sustained economic growth, and the
underlying driving forces that triggered the transition from stagnation to growth and the divergence in
income per capita across regions of the world.2
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1The transition from stagnation to growth is explored by Galor and Weil (1999, 2000), Galor and Moav (2002), Lucas
(2002), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Jones (2001), Doepke (2004), Fernandez-Villaverde (2001), Galor (2005), Lagerlof
(2006), O￿ Rourke, Rahman and Taylor (2008), as well as others. The association of this transition with the divergence in
income per capita across regions of the world is examined by Galor and Mountford (2006, 2008), Voigtlander and Voth
(2006), Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009), Broadberry (2007), and Ashraf and Galor (2009).
2Non-uni￿ed growth models have been instrumental in advancing our understanding of the role of factor accumulation
and technological progress in the growth process during the modern era. Nevertheless, they are inconsistent with the
qualitative aspects of the growth process over most of human existence. In particular, they are at odds with the evolution
1The advancement of Uni￿ed Growth Theory was fueled by the conviction that the understanding
of global variation in economic development would be fragile and incomplete unless growth theory would
re￿ ect the principal driving forces over the entire process of development and would capture the central
role played by historical and pre-historical factors in the prevailing disparity in economic development
across countries and regions.3 Moreover, it was fostered by the realization that a comprehensive un-
derstanding of the hurdles faced by less developed economies in reaching a state of sustained economic
growth would remain obscure unless the factors that brought about the transition of the currently de-
veloped economies into a state of sustained economic growth could be identi￿ed and modi￿ed to account
for the di⁄erences in the growth structure of less developed economies in an interdependent world.
Uni￿ed Growth Theory (Galor and Weil 1999, 2000, Galor and Moav 2002 and Galor 2005)
provides a fundamental framework of analysis for the evolution of economies over the entire course of
human history.4 It unveils the principal factors that have generated the remarkable escape from the
Malthusian epoch and their signi￿cance for the understanding of the contemporary growth process of
developed and less developed economies. Moreover, it sheds light on the forces that have triggered the
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Figure 1. The Evolution of Regional Income Per Capita over the Years 1 - 2000.6
of economies during the Malthusian epoch, when capital accumulation and technological progress were counterbalanced
almost entirely by an increase in the size of the population and had thus a negligible e⁄ect on the long-run level and
growth rate of income per capita. Moreover, they fail to identify the forces that triggered the demographic transition, the
take-o⁄ from stagnation to sustained economic growth, and the associated divergence in income per capita across countries
￿insights that are instrumental for the understanding of the growth process and comparative development.
3Clearly, the understanding of the contemporary world would be limited and incomplete in the absence of an historical
perspective. However, the intensity of the recent exploration of the interaction between economic development and
economic history could be attributed to the increasing frustration with the failure of the ahistorical branch of growth
theory to capture some of the most fundamental aspects of the growth process.
4Moreover, it sheds light on the interaction between economic development and human evolution and the potential role
of evolutionary processes in transition from stagnation to growth (Galor and Moav 2002).
5Some have argued that the divergence in income per capita in the past two centuries (Pritchett 1997) is accompanied
by the emergence of convergence clubs (Quah 1997). Others have noted that while divergence may have taken place across
countries, the recent decades were marked by convergence in income across individuals in the world (Sala-i-Martin 2006).
6The ratio of GDP per capita between the richest region and the poorest region in the world was only 1.1:1 in the year
1000, 2:1 in the year 1500, and 3:1 in the year 1820. In the course of the ￿ Great Divergence￿the ratio of GDP per capita
between the Western o⁄shoots (United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and Africa has widened considerably
2The theory suggests that the inherent Malthusian interaction between the level of technology
and the size and the composition of the population accelerated the pace of technological progress and
ultimately raised the importance of human capital in the rapidly changing technological environment.
The rise in the demand for human capital and its impact on the formation of human capital, as well
as on the onset of the demographic transition, has brought about signi￿cant technological advances
along with a reduction in fertility rates and population growth.7 It has enabled economies to divert
a larger share of the fruits of factor accumulation and technological progress from fueling population
growth towards the advancement in income per capita and has thus paved the way for the emergence
of sustained economic growth.
This paper explores the implications of Uni￿ed Growth Theory for the origins of the contemporary
variation in income per capita across countries and regions. The theory sheds light on three fundamental
aspects of comparative economic development. First, it identi￿es the factors that have governed the
pace of the transition from stagnation to growth and have thus contributed to the observed worldwide
di⁄erences in economic development. Second, it uncovers the forces that have sparked the emergence
of multiple growth regimes and convergence clubs and unveils the characteristics that determine the
association of economies with each of the clubs. Third, it underlines the persistent e⁄ects that variations
in pre-historical biogeographical conditions have generated on the composition of human capital and
economic development across the globe.
The theory implies that di⁄erences in the timing of the take-o⁄ from stagnation to growth across
countries contributed to the divergence in income per capita across the globe. The ￿rst layer of
the theory facilitates therefore the identi￿cation of pre-historical factors and their manifestation in the
composition of human capital, inequality in ownership over factors of production, trade patterns, as well
as institutional, demographic, and cultural factors, that have governed the pace of the transition from
an epoch of Malthusian stagnation to a state of sustained economic growth and have thus contributed
to the observed contemporary di⁄erences in economic development across countries.
The theory suggests that global variations in country-speci￿c characteristics that have in￿ uenced
the rate of technological progress have reinforced the di⁄erential pace of emergence of the demand for
human capital, the onset of the demographic transition, and the pace of the transition to sustained
economic growth, and have thus contributed to the great divergence in income per capita that was
observed in the past two centuries. In particular, worldwide variation in technological progress has been
triggered by cross-country di⁄erences in: (a) the level of protection of intellectual property rights, (b) the
stock of knowledge and its di⁄usion rate across members of society, (c) the level of human diversity and
the complementarity of the spectrum of human traits with the implementation and advancement of new
technological paradigms, (d) the composition of religious groups and their attitude towards knowledge
creation and di⁄usion, and (e) the propensity to trade and its e⁄ect on technological di⁄usion.
Moreover, the theory implies that, once the technologically-driven demand for human capital
emerged in the second phase of industrialization, the prevalence of characteristics conducive for human
capital formation has determined the swiftness of the process of human capital accumulation, the timing
of the demographic transition, the pace of the transition from stagnation to growth, and thereby the
from a modest 3:1 ratio in 1820, to a 5:1 ratio in 1870, a 9:1 ratio in 1913, a 15:1 ratio in 1950, and a large 18:1 ratio in
2001 (Maddison 2001).
7Clearly, the increased demand for human capital has not resulted necessarily in an increase in the rate of return to
human capital due to institutional changes (e.g., the provision of public education) that lowered the cost of investment in
human capital and facilitated a massive increase in the supply of education (Galor 2005, Section 2.3.3.).
3observed distribution of income in the world economy. Thus, variation in country-speci￿c characteristics
that have contributed to human capital formation has a⁄ected di⁄erentially the pace of the transition
from agriculture to industry and comparative development across the globe. In particular global varia-
tion in human capital formation has been triggered by cross-country di⁄erences in: (a) the prevalence
of human-capital-promoting institutions or policies (e.g., child labor regulations and the availability,
accessibility, and quality of public education), which may partly re￿ ect the distribution of ownership
over factors of production and the desirability of human capital formation for the landed aristocracy,
(b) the ability of individuals to ￿nance the cost of education as well as the foregone earnings associated
with schooling, (c) the level of inequality and the degree of credit market imperfections and their impact
on the extent of under-investment in education, (d) the stock of knowledge in society and its e⁄ect
on the productivity of investment of human capital, (e) the propensity to trade and the existence of
comparative (dis)advantage in the production of skilled intensive goods, and (f) preferences for educated
o⁄spring which may re￿ ect: (i) cultural attributes, (ii) the composition of religious groups and their
attitude towards education, and (iii) social status associated with education.
In its second layer, Uni￿ed Growth Theory advances the understanding of the forces that con-
tributed to the existence of multiple growth regimes and the emergence of convergence clubs, attributing
these phenomena to variation in the position of economies along the distinct phases of development. The
theory suggests that, although the long-run equilibrium may not di⁄er across economies, the di⁄erential
timing of take-o⁄s from stagnation to growth has segmented economies into three fundamental growth
regimes: slow growing economies in the vicinity of a Malthusian steady state, fast growing countries
in a sustained growth regime, and a third group of economies in the transition from one regime to
another. The presence of convergence clubs may be therefore temporary, and endogenous forces would
ultimately permit the members of the Malthusian club to shift their position and join the members of
the sustained-growth club. In contrast to existing research that links membership in each club and the
thresholds that permit economies to switch across these regimes to critical levels of income or human
capital, Uni￿ed Growth Theory implies that they are in fact associated primarily with critical rates of
technological progress, population growth and human capital formation.
Finally, in its third layer, Uni￿ed Growth Theory underlines the direct persistent e⁄ect that
variations in pre-historical biogeographical conditions (e.g., biodiversity, migratory distance from the
geographical origin of Homo sapiens and genetic diversity), have generated on global comparative devel-
opment over the entire course of human history. Recent advances by Asharf and Galor (2009) suggests
that indeed these biogeographical endowments, that were determined tens of thousands years ago, are
critical for the understanding of the course of comparative economic development from the dawn of hu-
man civilization to the modern era. In particular, these pre-historical factors have a direct, long lasting
e⁄ect on the existing di⁄erences in income per capita across countries that could not be captured by
contemporary geographical, institutional and cultural factors.
2 Uni￿ed Growth Theory
2.1 The Mysteries of the Growth Process
The evolution of societies and their mode of production since the emergence of Homo sapiens, approxi-
mately 100,000 years ago, has been characterized by three fundamental phases: hunting and gathering,
4agricultural and industrial societies. As depicted in Figure 2, during nearly 90% of their existence, mod-
ern humans were associated with small nomadic tribes that were engaged in hunting and gathering. The
onset of the Neolithic revolution about 10,000 years ago marked the transition of societies to sedentary
agricultural communities. During this phase of development that spans about 9.8% of human existence,
an increasing proportion of the human population has been engaged in agricultural production, that had
gradually di⁄used to most societies across the globe. Finally, the emergence of the Industrial Revolution
in the 18th century and the associated transition from agricultural to industrial societies initiated the
recent industrial phase that has ranged over roughly 0.2% of human existence.8
Figure 2. Phases of Development since the Emergence of Homo Sapiens.
The process of development during most of human existence was marked by Malthusian Stag-
nation. Technological progress was insigni￿cant by modern standards and resources generated by tech-
nological progress and land expansion were channeled primarily towards an increase in the size of the
population, with a minor long-run e⁄ect on income per capita. The positive e⁄ect of the standard of
living on population growth along with diminishing labor productivity kept income per capita in the
proximity of a subsistence level.9 Variations in technology and land quality across countries were re-
￿ ected primarily in di⁄erences in population density. The standard of living, in contrast, did not echo
the degree of technological advancement.10 In the past two centuries, in contrast, the pace of technolog-
ical progress intensi￿ed in association with the process of industrialization. Various regions of the world
departed from the Malthusian trap and experienced a considerable rise in the growth rates of income per
capita as well as population. Unlike episodes of technological progress in the pre-Industrial Revolution
era that failed to generate sustained economic growth, the increasing role of human capital in the pro-
duction process in the second phase of industrialization ultimately prompted a demographic transition
that liberated the gains in productivity from the counterbalancing e⁄ects of population growth. The
decline in the growth rate of population and the associated enhancement of technological progress and
human capital formation paved the way for the emergence of the modern state of sustained economic
growth.11
8Non-uni￿ed growth theory is designed to capture economic development of industrial societies in the post-demographic
transition era ￿an even smaller fraction of human existence.
9This subsistence level of consumption may have been well above the minimal physiological requirements that are
necessary in order to sustain an active human being.
10Cross-country evidence is supportive of the existence of a Malthusian epoch of stagnation (Ashraf and Galor 2008).
11For a detailed analysis of the main stages in the process of development see Galor (2005).
5Figure 2. Modes of Production since the Emergence of Homo Sapiens.
The last two centuries have witnessed dramatic changes in the distribution of income and popula-
tion across the globe. The di⁄erential timing of the take-o⁄ from stagnation to growth across countries
and the corresponding variation in the timing of the demographic transition have led to a great di-
vergence in income and to signi￿cant changes in the distribution of population over the globe. Some
regions have excelled in the growth of income per capita, while other regions have been dominant in
population growth. Inequality in the world economy had been insigni￿cant until the 19th century. The
ratio of GDP per capita between the richest region and the poorest region in the world was only 1.1:1
in 1000 AD, 2:1 in 1500 and 3:1 in 1820. In contrast, the past two centuries have been characterized by
a ￿ Great Divergence￿in income per capita among countries and regions. In particular, the ratio of GDP
per capita between the richest and the poorest regions has widened considerably from a modest 3:1 ratio
in 1820 to a large 18:1 ratio in 2001. An equally impressive transformation occurred in the distribution
of world population across regions. The earlier take-o⁄ of Western European countries generated a
16% increase in the share of their population in the world economy within the time period 1820-1870.
However, the early onset of the Western European demographic transition and the long delay in the
demographic transition of less developed regions well into the second half of the 20th century led to a
55% decline in the share of Western European population in the world in the time period 1870-1998.
In contrast, the prolongation of the Post-Malthusian period of less developed regions and the delay in
their demographic transitions, generated a 84% increase in Africa￿ s share of world population from 7%
in 1913 to 12.9% in 1998, an 11% increase in Asia￿ s share of world population from 51.7% in 1913 to
57.4% in 1998, and a four-fold increase in Latin America￿ s share in world population from 2% in 1820
to 8.6% in 1998.
Uni￿ed growth theory explores the fundamental factors that have generated the remarkable escape
from the Malthusian epoch and their signi￿cance for the understanding of the contemporary growth
process of developed and less developed economies. It deciphers some of the most fundamental questions
that have been shrouded in mystery: what accounts for the epoch of stagnation that characterized most
of human history? why had episodes of technological progress in the pre-industrialization era failed
to generate sustained economic growth? why has population growth counterbalanced the expansion of
resources per capita that could have been generated by technological progress? what is the origin of
the sudden spurt in growth rates of output per capita and population in the course of industrialization?
6what was the source of the dramatic reversal in the positive relationship between income per capita and
population that existed throughout most of human history? what triggered the demographic transition?
would the transition to a state of sustained economic growth have been feasible without the demographic
transition? what accounts for the transition from stagnation to growth of the currently DCs and what
are the implications of these factors for the hurdles faced by LDCs in their attempt to transit into a
sustained growth regime? and, what are the underlying behavioral and technological structures that
can simultaneously account for these distinct phases of development and what are their implications for
the contemporary growth process of developed and underdeveloped countries?
Moreover, uni￿ed growth theory sheds light on the perplexing phenomenon of the divergence in
income per capita across regions of the world in the past two centuries: what accounts for the sudden
take-o⁄ from stagnation to growth in some countries in the world and the persistent stagnation in
others? why has the positive link between income per capita and population growth reversed its course
in some economies but not in others? what governs the di⁄erential timing of the demographic transition
across the globe? why have the di⁄erences in per capita incomes across regions of the world increased
so markedly in the last two centuries? and has the transition to a state of sustained economic growth
in advanced economies adversely a⁄ected the process of development in less-developed economies?
2.2 The Fundamental Challenge
The establishment of a theory of economic growth that provides a unifying framework for the process
of development in its entirety has been a great intellectual challenge. It required major methodological
and conceptual innovations in the construction of a uni￿ed microeconomic framework, and thus a single
dynamical system, that captures the unique characteristics of each phase in the process of development,
while orchestrating an endogenous transition across these distinct phases.
In light of historical evidence that the take-o⁄ from the Malthusian epoch to a state of sustained
economic growth, rapid as it may appear, was a gradual process (Crafts 1985 and Crafts and Harley
1992), the development of a uni￿ed growth theory necessitated the construction of a dynamical system,
in which economies take o⁄ gradually but swiftly from an absorbing (stable) Malthusian equilibrium ￿
an apparent contradiction to the notion of an absorbing state.12 However, the long era of Malthusian
stagnation in income per capita masked a latent Malthusian dynamism (Ashraf and Galor 2008 and
Voigtlander and Voth 2009) that ultimately brought about the phase transition that was associated with
the take-o⁄ from the Malthusian equilibrium. In particular, although the growth of income per capita
was miniscule over the Malthusian epoch, in the course of the Malthusian interaction between technology
and population, technological progress intensi￿ed and world population signi￿cantly increased in size ￿
a dynamism that was instrumental for the emergence of economies from the Malthusian epoch.
Thus, as proposed by Galor and Weil (2000), the phase transition associated with the take-o⁄
from the Malthusian epoch was orchestrated by the impact of the evolution of these latent state variables
on the dynamical system. In particular, the observed rapid, yet continuous, phase transition is captured
by a single dynamical system, once the evolution of latent state variables in the Malthusian epoch alters
the qualitative structure of the dynamical system. The absorbing Malthusian equilibrium vanishes and
12Thus, the Industrial Revolution could not be plausibly viewed as an outcome of a major shock that shifted economies
from the basin of attraction of the Malthusian equilibrium to that of the Modern Growth Regime. In particular, the
simplest methodology for the generation of a phase transition, namely, a major shock in an environment characterized by
multiple locally stable equilibria, appears inappropriate for generating the observed take-o⁄ from stagnation to growth.
7the economy gravitates towards a unique and stable sustained growth steady-state equilibrium.
Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2002) develop a uni￿ed growth theory in which the
endogenous evolution of population, technology, and income per capita is consistent with the process of
development in the last thousands of years. These theories capture the fundamental regimes that have
characterized the process of development as well as the fundamental driving forces that generated the
transition from an epoch of Malthusian stagnation to a state of sustained economic growth. These models
introduce the methodological and conceptual innovation that the evolution of latent state variables was
a critical force in the observed phase transition. During the Malthusian epoch the dynamical system is
characterized by a stable Malthusian equilibrium, but eventually due to a latent progression in demand
for human capital (Galor and Weil 2000) or a Darwinian evolution in the propensity of individuals
to invest in human capital (Galor and Moav 2002), the Malthusian steady-state equilibrium vanishes
endogenously leaving the arena for the gravitational forces of the emerging sustained growth steady-state
equilibrium.
2.3 Central Building Blocks
The theory is based upon the interaction between several building blocks: the Malthusian elements,
the engines of technological progress, the origin of human capital formation, and the trigger for the
demographic transition.
The Malthusian elements. The process of development during most of human existence was
marked by Malthusian Stagnation. Resources generated by technological progress and land expansion
were channeled primarily towards an increase in the size of the population, with a minor long-run e⁄ect
on income per capita. The positive e⁄ect of the standard of living on population growth along with
diminishing labor productivity left income per capita in the proximity of a subsistence level (Malthus
1798).
The Malthusian epoch is captured in Uni￿ed Growth Theory based on three central elements:
(a) the production process is characterized by decreasing returns to labor due to the limited availability
of land, (b) parents generate utility from their children and the production of children is time intensive,
and, (c) individuals are subjected to a subsistence consumption constraint.13 Thus, as long as the
subsistence constraint is binding, an increase in income results in an increase in population growth.
Technological progress, which brings about temporary gains in income per capita, triggers therefore an
increase in the size of the population that o⁄sets the gain in income per capita due to the existence of
decreasing returns to labor.
The engines of technological progress. The acceleration in technological progress in the course
of industrialization is a fundamental force in the transition from stagnation to growth. While the size
of the population stimulates technological progress in early stages of development, human capital for-
mation is the prime engine of technological progress in more advanced stages of development. Uni￿ed
growth theory supposes that in the Malthusian era, when the technological frontier re￿ ected the working
environment of most individuals, the scale of the population a⁄ected the rate of technological progress
via its e⁄ect on: (a) the supply of innovative ideas, (b) the demand for innovations, (c) the rate of
technological di⁄usion, (d) the degree of specialization in the production process and thus the extent
of ￿ learning by doing￿ , and (e) the scope for inter-regional trade and thus the extent of technological
13Bioeconomic foundations of the Malthusian equilibrium are explored by Dalgaard and Strulik (2007).
8imitation and adoption.14 However, as advancements of the technological frontier become increasingly
more complex in later stages of development, human capital is more signi￿cant in the process of tech-
nological progress (e.g., Nelson and Phelps 1966 Schultz 1975) and educated individuals are more likely
to advance the technological frontier.
The origin of human capital formation. The rise in industrial demand for human capital in
advanced stages of industrialization (Galor 2005, section 2.3.3) and its impact on human capital forma-
tion and the demographic transition is a central component of the growth process and the transition to
modern economic growth. Uni￿ed growth theory postulates that changes in the economic environment
that are triggered by technological progress raise the demand for, and thus the formation of, human
capital, since educated individuals have a comparative advantage in adapting to the new technological
environment.15 Although technologies may be either skill-biased or skill-saving in the long-run, the
introduction of new technologies increases the demand for human capital in the short-run.16
The trigger for the demographic transition. The demographic transition that marked the onset
of the state of sustained economic growth is a focal development in the transition from stagnation
to growth. The demographic transition brought about a reversal in the unprecedented increase in
population growth that occurred during the Post-Malthusian regime. The reduction in fertility rates
and population growth have enhanced the growth process via several channels. They have reduced
the dilution of the stock of capital and land, enhanced investment in human capital, and altered the
age distribution of the population, increasing temporarily the size of the labor force relative to the
population as a whole. Thus, the demographic transition has enabled economies to convert a larger
share of the fruits of factor accumulation and technological progress into growth of output per capita.
Uni￿ed Growth Theory postulates that the rise in the demand for human capital triggered the
decline in fertility. Individuals generate utility from the quantity and the quality of their children as well
as from their own consumption. They choose the number of children and their quality in the face of a
constraint on the total amount of time that can be devoted to child-raising and labor market activities.
While a rise in parental income (due to the rise in the demand for human capital) would generate
con￿ icting income and substitution e⁄ects and would not necessarily trigger a decline in fertility,17 the
e⁄ect of the rise in the demand for human capital on the potential future earning of a child generates
a pure substitution e⁄ect. It induces parents to substitute quality for quantity of children and thus
operates towards a decline in fertility.18
14The positive e⁄ect of the scale of the population on technological progress in the Malthusian epoch is supported
empirically (Boserup 1965 and Kremer 1993). The role of the scale of the population in the modern era is, however,
controversial. As technological progress becomes human capital intensive, if the scale of the population comes on the
account of population quality, it may have an ambiguous e⁄ect on technological progress.
15If the demand for education rises with the level of technology the qualitative results would not be a⁄ected. Adopting
this mechanism, however, would be equivalent to assuming that changes in technology were skill-biased throughout human
history, in contrast with periods in which the characteristics of new technologies could be de￿ned as unskilled-biased, most
notably, during the ￿rst phase of the Industrial Revolution.
16The e⁄ect of technological transition on the return to human capital is at the center of the theoretical approach of
Nelson and Phelps (1966), Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Galor and Moav (2000), and Hassler and Rodriguez Mora (2000).
It is supported empirically by Schultz (1975) and Foster and Rosenzweig (1996).
17The central building block in Becker and Lewis (1973) is the domination of the substitution e⁄ect at high levels of
income. Historical evidence, however, appears inconsistent with this central supposition (Galor 2005, 227-228).
18The existence of a trade-o⁄ between quantity and quality of children is supported empirically (e.g., Hanushek 1992 and
Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1980), and its presence in the post-industrialization, but pre-demographic transition era, when
the income e⁄ect is still dominating, has been documented recently by Becker, Cinnirella and Woessmann (2009).
92.4 The Basic Structure of the Model
Consider an overlapping-generations economy in which activity extends over in￿nite discrete time. In
every period the economy produces a single homogeneous good using land and e¢ ciency units of labor
as inputs. The supply of land is exogenous and ￿xed over time whereas the number of e¢ ciency units
of labor is determined by households￿decisions in the preceding period regarding the number and level
of human capital of their children.
Production of Final Output. Production occurs according to a constant-returns-to-scale technology
that is subject to endogenous technological progress. The output produced at time t; Yt; is
Yt = H￿
t (AtX)1￿￿; (1)
where Ht is the aggregate quantity of e¢ ciency units of labor employed in period t; X is land employed
in production in every period t, At represents the endogenously determined technological level in period
t; and AtX is therefore the ￿e⁄ective resources￿employed in production in period t; and ￿ 2 (0;1):





where ht ￿ Ht=Lt is the level of e¢ ciency units of labor per worker, and xt ￿ (AtX)=Lt is the level
of e⁄ective resources per worker at time t.
Suppose that there are no property rights over land.19 The return to land is therefore zero, and
the wage per e¢ ciency unit of labor is therefore equal to the output per e¢ ciency unit of labor:
wt = (xt=ht)1￿￿: (3)
Preferences and Budget Constraints. In each period t; a generation that consists of Lt identical
individuals joins the labor force. Each individual has a single parent. Members of generation t (those
who join the labor force in period t) live for two periods. In the ￿rst period of life (childhood), t ￿ 1;
individuals consume a fraction of their parental unit time endowment. The required time increases with
children￿ s quality. In the second period of life (parenthood), t; individuals are endowed with one unit of
time, which they allocate between child rearing and labor force participation. They choose the optimal
mixture of quantity and quality of (surviving) children and supply their remaining time in the labor
market, consuming their wages.
Preferences of memebers of generation t are represented by a utility function, ut; de￿ned over
consumption above a subsistence level ~ c > 0; as well as over the quantity and quality (measured by
human capital) of their (surviving) children:20
ut = ct
1￿￿(ntht+1)￿; ￿ 2 (0;1); (4)
19Allowing for capital accumulation and property rights over land would complicate the model to the point of intractabil-
ity, but would not a⁄ect the qualitative results.
20For simplicity parents derive utility from the expected number of surviving o⁄spring and the parental cost of child
rearing is associated only with surviving children. A more realistic cost structure would not a⁄ect the qualitative features
of the theory.
10where ct is the consumption of individual of generation t; nt is the number of (surviving) children of
individual t; and ht+1 is the level of human capital of each child.21 The utility function is strictly
monotonically increasing and strictly quasi-concave, satisfying the conventional boundary conditions
that assure, for a su¢ ciently high income, the existence of an interior solution for the utility maximization
problem. However, for a su¢ ciently low level of income the subsistence consumption constraint is binding
and there is a corner solution with respect to the consumption level.
Individuals choose the number of children and their quality in the face of a constraint on the
total amount of time that can be devoted to child-raising and labor market activities. Let ￿ + et+1
be the time cost for a member i of generation t of raising a child with a level of education (quality)
et+1.22 That is, ￿ is the fraction of the individual￿ s unit time endowment that is required in order to
raise a child, regardless of quality, and et+1 is the fraction of the individual￿ s unit time endowment that
is devoted for the education of each child.23
Consider members of generation t who are endowed with ht e¢ ciency units of labor at time t:
De￿ne potential income, zt; as the potential earning if the entire time endowment is devoted to labor
force participation, earning the competitive market wage, wt; per e¢ ciency unit. The potential income,
zt ￿ wtht; is divided between consumption, ct; and expenditure on child rearing (quantity as well as
quality), evaluated according to the value of the time cost, wtht[￿ + et+1]; per child. Hence, in the
second period of life (parenthood), the individual faces the budget constraint
wthtnt(￿ + et+1) + ct ￿ wtht ￿ zt: (5)
The Production of Human Capital. Individuals￿level of human capital is determined by their
quality (education) as well as by the technological environment. Technological progress reduces the
adaptability of existing human capital to the new technological environment (the ￿ erosion e⁄ect￿ ). Ed-
ucation, however, lessens the adverse e⁄ects of technological progress. In particular, the time required
for adaptation to a new technological environment diminishes with the level of education and increases
with the rate of technological change.
The level of human capital of children of a member i of generation t; hi
t+1; is an increasing strictly
concave function of their parental time investment in education, ei
t+1; and a decreasing strictly convex
function of the rate of technological progress, gt+1 ￿ (At+1 ￿ At)=At :
ht+1 = h(et+1;gt+1): (6)
Education lessens the adverse e⁄ect of technological progress. That is, technology complements skills
in the production of human capital (i.e., heg(ei
t+1;gt+1) > 0): In the absence of investment in quality,
21Alternatively, the utility function could have been de￿ned over consumption above subsistence rather than over a
consumption set that is truncated from below by the subsistence consumption constraint. In particular, if ut = (ct ￿
~ c)(1￿￿)(ntht+1)￿; the qualitative analysis would not be a⁄ected, but the complexity of the dynamical system would be
greatly enhanced. The income expansion path would be smooth, transforming continuously from being nearly vertical for
low levels of potential income to asymptotically horizontal for high levels of potential income.
22The time required to produce a child can be purchased from other individuals. However, in the absence of heterogeneity
across individuals, or increasing returns in the production of human capital these transactions will not take place. As
follows from Galor and Moav (2002), the introduction of heterogeneity will not a⁄ect the qualitative analysis. Moreover,
if there exists increasing returns in the production of education, or if both time and goods are required in order to produce
child quality, the process would be intensi￿ed. As the economy develops and wages increase, and as the demand for human
capital formation rises, the relative cost of child quality will diminish and individuals will substitute quality for quantity
of children.
23￿ is assumed to be su¢ ciently small so as to assure that population can have a positive growth rate. That is, ￿ < ￿:
11each individual has a basic level of human capital that is normalized to 1 in a stationary technological
environment, i.e., h(0;0) = 1:24
Optimization. Members of generation t choose the number and quality of their (surviving) children
and their own consumption so as to maximize their intertemporal utility function subject to the subsis-
tence consumption constraint. Substituting (5)-(6) into (4), the optimization problem of a member of
generation t is:
fnt;et+1g = argmaxfwtht[1 ￿ nt(￿ + et+1)]g1￿￿fnth(et+1;gt+1)g￿ (7)
subject to:
wtht[1 ￿ nt(￿ + et+1)] ￿ ~ c;
(nt;et+1) ￿ 0:
Hence, as long as potential income at time t is su¢ ciently high so as to assure that ct > ~ c (i.e.,
as long as zt ￿ wtht is above the level of potential income at which the subsistence constraint is just
binding, (i.e., zt > ~ z ￿ ~ c=(1 ￿ ￿))); the fraction of time spent by a member of generation t raising
children is ￿; while 1 ￿ ￿ is devoted to labor force participation. However, if zt ￿ ~ z , the subsistence
constraint is binding, the fraction of time necessary to assure subsistence consumption, ~ c; is larger than
1 ￿ ￿ and the fraction of time devoted for child rearing is therefore below ￿: That is,




￿ if zt ￿ ~ z;
1 ￿ [~ c=wtht] if zt ￿ ~ z:
(8)
Figure 3 shows the e⁄ect of an increase in potential income zt on the individual￿ s allocation of
time between child rearing and consumption. The income expansion path is vertical as long as the
subsistence consumption constraint is binding. As the wage per e¢ ciency unit of labor increases in this
income range, the individual can generate the subsistence consumption with a lower level of labor force
participation and the fraction of time devoted to child rearing increases. Once the level of income is
su¢ ciently high such that the subsistence consumption constraint is not binding, the income expansion
path becomes horizontal at a level ￿ in terms of time devoted to child rearing.
24For simplicity, investment in quality is not bene￿cial in a stationary technological environment, i.e., he(0;0) = 0, and
in the absence of investment in education, there exists a su¢ ciently rapid technological progress, that due to the erosion
e⁄ect renders the existing human capital obsolete (i.e., limg!1 h(0;g) = 0): Furthermore, although the potential number
of e¢ ciency units of labor is diminished due to the transition from the existing technological state to a superior one (due
to the erosion e⁄ect), each individual operates with a superior level of technology and the productivity e⁄ect is assumed





















Figure 3. Preferences, Constraints, and Income Expansion Path.
Note: The ￿gure depicts the household￿ s indi⁄erence curves, budget constraints, as well as the subsistence
consumption constraint, c ￿ ~ c. The income expansion path is vertical as long as the subsistence consumption
constraint is binding and horizontal at a level ￿ once the subsistence consumption constraint is not binding.
Furthermore, the optimization with respect to et+1 implies that the level of education chosen by
members of generation t for their children, et+1; is an increasing function of gt+1: In particular, there





= 0 if gt+1 ￿ ^ g;
> 0 if gt+1 > ^ g;
(9)
where e0(gt+1) > 0 and e00(gt+1) < 0 8gt+1 > ^ g > 0:25
Hence, the optimal level of investment in child quality and thus the optimal division of child-
rearing time between quality and quantity is una⁄ected by the parental level of income, but only by the
rate of technological progress via its e⁄ect on the demand for education.






￿+e(gt+1) ￿ nb(gt+1) if zt ￿ ~ z;
1￿[~ c=zt]
￿+e(gt+1) ￿ na(gt+1;z(et;gt;xt)) if zt ￿ ~ z:
(10)
where zt ￿ wtht = z(et;gt;xt) as follows from (3) and (6)
Hence, as follows from the properties of e(gt+1);nb(gt+1); and na(gt+1;zt):
(a) An increase in the rate of technological progress reduces the number of children and increases their
quality, i.e.,
@nt=@gt+1 ￿ 0 and @et+1=@gt+1 ￿ 0:
25e00(gt+1) depends upon the third derivatives of the production function of human capital. e(gt+1) is assumed to be
concave, which appears plausible.
13(b) If the subsistence consumption constraint is binding (i.e., if parental potential income is below ~ z),
an increase in parental potential income raises the number of children, but has no e⁄ect on their quality,
i.e.,
@nt=@zt > 0 and @et+1=@zt = 0 if zt < ~ z:
(c) If the subsistence consumption constraint is not binding (i.e., if parental potential income is above
~ z), an increase in parental potential income does not a⁄ect the number of children or their quality, i.e.,
@nt=@zt = @et+1=@zt = 0 if zt > ~ z:
Technological Progress. Suppose that technological progress, gt+1; that takes place between periods
t and t + 1 depends upon the education per capita among the working generation in period t; et; and





where for et ￿ 0 and a su¢ ciently large population size, Lt; g(0;Lt) > 0; gi(et;Lt) > 0; and
gii(et;Lt) < 0; i = et;Lt:27 Hence, for a su¢ ciently large population size, the rate of technological
progress between time t and t+1 is a positive, increasing, strictly concave function of the size and level
of education of the working generation at time t: Furthermore, the rate of technological progress is
positive even if labor quality is zero.
The state of technology at time t + 1; At+1; is therefore
At+1 = (1 + gt+1)At; (12)
where the state of technology at time 0 is given at a level A0:
Population. The size of population at time t + 1; Lt+1; is
Lt+1 = ntLt; (13)
where Lt is the size of population at time t and nt is the number of children per person; L0 is given.





nb(gt+1)Lt if zt ￿ ~ z;
na(gt+1;z(et;gt;xt))Lt if zt ￿ ~ z:
(14)
26While the role of the scale e⁄ect in the Malthusian epoch is essential, none of the results depend on the presence or
the absence of the scale e⁄ect in the modern era. The functional form of technological progress given in (11) can capture
both the presence and the absence of the scale e⁄ect in the modern era. In particular, the scale e⁄ect can be removed,
once investment in education is positive, assuming for instance that limL!1 gL(et;L) = 0 for et > 0.
27For a su¢ ciently small population the rate of technological progress is strictly positive only every several periods.
Furthermore, the number of periods that pass between two episodes of technological improvement declines with the size
of population. These assumptions assure that in early stages of development the economy is in a Malthusian steady-state
with zero growth rate of output per capita, but ultimately the growth rate becomes positive and slow. If technological
progress would occur in every time period at a pace that increases with the size of population, the growth rate of output
per capita would be positive in every period, despite the adjustment in the size of population.
14E⁄ective Resources. The evolution of e⁄ective resources per worker, xt ￿ (AtX)=Lt; is determined















￿ xt ￿ ￿
b(et;Lt)xt if zt ￿ ~ z;
[1+g(et;Lt)][￿+e(g(et;Lt))]
1￿[~ c=z(et;gt;xt)] xt ￿ ￿
a(et;gt;xt;Lt)xt if zt ￿ ~ z:
(16)
2.5 The Dynamical System
The development of the economy is fully determined by a sequence fet;gt;xt;Ltg1
t=0 that satis￿es (9),
(11), (14), and (16), in every period t and describes the joint evolution of education, technological
progress, e⁄ective resources per capita, and population over time.
The dynamical system is characterized by two regimes. In the ￿rst regime the subsistence con-
sumption constraint is binding and the evolution of the economy is governed by a four dimensional








Lt+1 = na(g(et;Lt); z(et;gt;xt))Lt
for zt ￿ ~ z; (17)
where the initial conditions e0;g0;x0 and L0 are historically given.
In the second regime the subsistence consumption constraint is not binding and the evolution of








for zt ￿ ~ z: (18)
In both regimes, however, the analysis of the dynamical system is greatly simpli￿ed by the fact
that the evolution of et and gt is independent of whether the subsistence constraint is binding, and that,
for a given population size L; the joint evolution of et and gt is determined independently of xt. The
education level of workers in period t + 1 depends only on the level of technological progress expected
between period t and period t + 1; while technological progress between periods t and t + 1; for a given
population size L; depends only on the level of education in period t: Thus, for a given population
size L; the dynamics of technology and education can be analyzed independently of the evolution of
resources per capita.
A. The Dynamics of Technology and Education. The evolution of technology and education, for
a given population size L; is characterized by the sequence fgt;et;Lg1





In light of the properties of the functions e(gt+1) and g(et;L); this dynamical sub-system is
characterized by three qualitatively di⁄erent con￿gurations, which are depicted in the top panels of
Figures 4, 5 and 6. The inherent Malthusian interaction between the size of the population and the
level of technology increases gradually the size of population and the rate of technological progress and
generates an upward shift in the curve g(et;L): Ultimately, the rate of technological progress exceeds the
threshold level, ^ g; above which investment in the human capital is bene￿cial, the Malthusian steady-state
vanishes and the economy is gravitated towards the modern growth regime.
In particular, for a range of small population size, depicted in the top panel of Figure 4, the
dynamical system is characterized by a globally stable steady-state equilibrium, (￿ e(L); ￿ g(L)) = (0;gl(L)),
where gl(L) increases with the size of the population while the level of education remains unchanged.
For a range of moderate population size, as depicted in the top panel of Figure 5, the dynamical system
is characterized by three steady-state equilibria, two locally stable steady-state equilibria: (0;gl(L)) and
(eh(L);gh(L)); and an interior unstable steady-state equilibrium (eu(L);gu(L)); where (eh(L);gh(L))
and gl(L) increase monotonically with the size of the population. Finally, for a range of large population
size, as depicted in the top panel of Figure 6, the dynamical system is characterized by a globally stable
steady-state equilibrium, (eh(L);gh(L));where eh(L) and gh(L) increase monotonically with the size of
the population.
B. Global Dynamics. This analysis of the evolution of the economy from the Malthusian Regime,
through the Post-Malthusian Regime, to the demographic transition and Modern Growth is based on a
sequence of phase diagrams that describe the evolution of the system, within each regime, for a given
population size, and the transition between these regimes as population increases in the process of
development. Each of the phase diagrams is a projection of the three dimensional system fet;gt;xt;Lg
to the plane (et;xt;L):29
The phase diagrams, depicted in the bottom panels of Figures 4, 5 and 6, contain three elements:
the Malthusian Frontier, which separates the regions in which the subsistence constraint is binding from
those where it is not; the XX locus, which denotes the set of all triplets (et;gt;xt;L) for which e⁄ective
resources per worker are constant; and the EE locus, which denotes the set of all pairs (et;gt;L) for
which the level of education per worker is constant.
The Malthusian Frontier.
As was established in (17) and (18) the economy exits from the subsistence consumption regime
when potential income, zt; exceeds the critical level ~ z: This switch of regime changes the dimensionality
of the dynamical system from three to two, for ￿xed L:
Let the Malthusian Frontier be the set of all triplets (et;xt;gt;L) for which individuals￿incomes
equal ~ z:30 Using the de￿nitions of zt and ~ z; it follows from (3) and (6) that the Malthusian Frontier is
28Although this dynamical sub-system consists of two independent one dimensional, non-linear ￿rst-order di⁄erence
equations, it is more revealing to analyze them jointly.
29See Galor (2007) for the analysis of discrete dynamical systems.
30Below the Malthusian Frontier, the e⁄ect of income on fertility will be positive, while above the frontier there will be
no e⁄ect of income on fertility. Thus, the Malthusian Frontier separates the Malthusian and Post-Malthusian Regimes, on
16MM ￿ f(et;xt;gt;L) : x
1￿￿
t h(et;gt)￿ = ~ c=(1 ￿ ￿)g:
Let the Conditional Malthusian Frontier be the set of all pairs (et;xt;L) for which, conditional
on a given technological level gt; individuals￿incomes equal ~ z: Following the de￿nitions of zt and ~ z;
equations (3) and (6) imply that the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, MMjgt; is MMjgt ￿ f(et;xt;L) :
x
1￿￿
t h(et;gt)￿ = ~ c=(1 ￿ ￿) j gtg; where xt is a decreasing strictly convex function of et along the
MMjgtlocus.
Hence, the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, as depicted in the bottom panels of Figures 4,5 and
6, is a strictly convex, downward sloping curve in the (et;xt) space. Furthermore, it intersects the xt
axis and approaches asymptotically the et axis as xt approaches in￿nity. The frontier shifts upward as
gt increases in the process of development.
The XX Locus.
Let XX be the locus of all triplets (et;gt;xt;L) such that the e⁄ective resources per worker, xt;
are in a steady-state: XX ￿ f(et;xt;gt;L) : xt+1 = xtg:
If the subsistence consumption constraint is not binding (i.e., if zt ￿ ~ z); it follows from (16) that





> 0 if et > ^ e(L);
= 0 if et = ^ e(L);
< 0 if et < ^ e(L):
(20)
Hence, the XX Locus, as depicted in Figures 4-6 is a vertical line above the Conditional Malthusian
Frontier at a level ^ e(L):
If the subsistence constraint is binding, the evolution of xt is based upon the rate of technological
change, gt; the e⁄ective resources per-worker, xt; as well as the quality of the labor force, et: Let
XXjgt be the locus of all pairs (et;xt;L) such that xt+1 = xt; for a given level of gt: That is,
XXjgt ￿ f(et;xt;L) : xt+1 = xt j gtg It follows from (16) that for zt ￿ ~ z; and for 0 ￿ et ￿ ^ e(L); there





< 0 if (et;xt) > (et;x(et)) for 0 ￿ et ￿ ^ e(L);
= 0 if xt = x(et) for 0 ￿ et ￿ ^ e(L);
> 0 if [(et;xt) < (et;x(et)) for 0 ￿ et ￿ ^ e(L)] or [et > ^ e(L)]:
(21)
Hence, without loss of generality, the locus XXjgt (i.e., the XX locus below the Conditional
Malthusian Frontier) is depicted in Figure 4, as an upward sloping curve in the space (et;xt); de￿ned
for et ￿ ^ e(L): XXjgt is strictly below the Conditional Malthusian Frontier for values of et < ^ e(L);
and the two coincide at ^ e(L): Moreover, the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, the XX locus above the
Conditional Malthusian Frontier, and the XXjgt locus coincide at (^ e(L); ^ x(L)):
The EE Locus.
Let EE be the locus of all triplets (et;gt;xt;L) such that the quality of labor, et; is in a steady-
state: EE ￿ f(et;xt;gt;L) : et+1 = etg:
the one hand, from the Modern Growth regime, on the other. Crossing this frontier is associated with the demographic
transition.
31In order to simplify the exposition without a⁄ecting the qualitative nature of the dynamical system, the parameters of
the model are restricted so as to assure that the XX locus is non-empty when zt ￿ ~ z: That is, ^ g < (￿=￿)￿1 < g(eh(L0);L0):
17As follows from (9) and (11), et+1 = e(g(et;L)) and thus, for a given population size, the steady-
state values of et are independent of the values of xt and gt: The locus EE evolves through three
phases in the process of development, corresponding to the three phases that describe the evolution of
education and technology, as depicted in the top panels of Figures 4-6.
In early stages of development, when population size is su¢ ciently small, the joint evolution
of education and technology is characterized by a globally stable temporary steady-state equilibrium,
(￿ e(L); ￿ g(L)) = (0;gl(L)); as depicted in the top panel of Figure 4. The corresponding EE locus, depicted
in the space (et;xt;L) in the bottom panel of Figure 4, is vertical at the level e = 0; for a range of
small population sizes. Furthermore, for this range, the global dynamics of et are given by:
et+1 ￿ et
￿
= 0 if et = 0;
< 0 if et > 0: (22)
In later stages of development, as population size increases su¢ ciently, the joint evolution of
education and technology is characterized by multiple locally stable temporary steady-state equilibria,
as depicted in the top panel of Figure 5. The corresponding EE locus, depicted in the space (et;xt;L)
in the bottom panel of Figure 5, consists of three vertical lines corresponding to the three steady-state
equilibria for the value of et: That is, e = 0; e = eu(L); and e = eh(L): The vertical lines e = eu(L)
and e = eh(L) shift leftward and rightward, respectively, as population size increases. Furthermore,





< 0 if 0 < et < eu(L) or et > eh(L);
= 0 if et 2 f0; eu(L); eh(L)g;
> 0 if eu(L) < et < eh(L):
(23)
In mature stages of development, when population size is su¢ ciently large, the joint evolution of
education and technology is characterized by a globally stable steady-state equilibrium, (￿ e(L); ￿ g(L)) =
(eh(L);gh(L)); as depicted in the top panel of Figure 6. The corresponding EE locus, as depicted in the
bottom panel of Figure 6 in the space (et;xt;L), is vertical at the level e = eh(L): This vertical line






> 0 if 0 ￿ et < eh(L);
= 0 if et = eh(L);
< 0 if et > eh(L):
(24)
Conditional Steady-State Equilibria.
In early stages of development, when population size is su¢ ciently small, the dynamical sys-
tem, as depicted in Figure 4 is characterized by a unique and globally stable conditional steady-state
equilibrium.32 It is given by the point of intersection between the EE locus and the XX locus. That
is, conditional on a given technological level, gt; the Malthusian steady-state equilibrium, (0; ￿ x(L)); is
32Since the dynamical system is discrete, the trajectories implied by the phase diagrams do not necessarily approximate
the actual dynamic path, unless the state variables evolve monotonically over time. As shown, the evolution of et is
monotonic, whereas the evolution and convergence of xt may be oscillatory. Non-monotonicity in the evolution of xt may
arise only if e < ^ e and it does not a⁄ect the qualitative description of the system. Furthermore, if ￿a
x(et;gt;xt)xt > ￿1
the conditional dynamical system is locally non-oscillatory. The phase diagrams in the bottom panels of Figures 4-6 are
drawn under the assumptions that assure that there are no oscillations.
18globally stable.33 In later stages of development, as population size increases su¢ ciently, the dynam-
ical system, as depicted in Figure 5, is characterized by two conditional steady-state equilibria. The
Malthusian conditional steady-state equilibrium is locally stable, whereas the steady-state equilibrium
(eu(L);xu(L)) is a saddle point.34 For education levels above eu(L) the system, as depicted in Figure
6, converges to a stationary level of education eh(L) and possibly to a steady-state growth rate of xt: In
mature stages of development, when population size is su¢ ciently large, the system converges globally
to an educational level eh(L) and possibly to a steady-state growth rate of xt:
2.6 From Malthusian Stagnation to Sustained Growth
The economy evolves from an epoch of Malthusian stagnation through the Post-Malthusian Regime to
the demographic transition and a Modern Growth Regime.35 This pattern and the prime driving forces
in this transition emerge from the phase diagrams depicted in Figures 4-6.
Consider an economy in early stages of development. Population size is relatively small and the
implied slow rate of technological progress does not provide an incentive to invest in the education of
children. As depicted in the top panel of Figure 4; the interaction between education, et; and the rate
of technological change, gt; for a constant small population, L; is characterized by a globally stable
steady-state equilibrium (0;gl(L)); where education is zero and the rate of technological progress is
slow. This steady-state equilibrium corresponds to a globally stable conditional Malthusian steady-
state equilibrium, depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 4. For a constant small population, L; and
for a given rate of technological progress, e⁄ective resources per capita, as well as the level of education,
are constant, and output per capita is therefore constant as well. Moreover, shocks to population or
resources are resolved in a classic Malthusian fashion.
As population grows slowly in reaction to technological progress, the g(et;L) locus, depicted in
the top panel of Figure 4, gradually shifts upward and the steady-state equilibrium shifts vertically
upward re￿ ecting small increments in the rate of technological progress, while the level of education
remains constant at a zero level. Similarly, the conditional Malthusian steady-state equilibrium drawn
in the bottom panel of Figure 4 shifts vertically upward, as the XX locus shifts upward. However,
output per capita remains initially constant at the subsistence level and ultimately creeps forward at a
miniscule rate.
33The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the conditional dynamical system evaluated at the conditional steady-state
equilibrium, (0;x(gt)); are both smaller than one (in absolute value).
34Convergence to the saddle point takes place only if the level of education is eu: That is, the saddle path is the entire
vertical line that corresponds to et = eu:
35The uni￿ed theory of Galor and Weil is calibrated by Lagerlof (2006). His analysis demonstrates that the theory
quantitatively replicates the observed time paths of population, income per capita, and human capital, generating (a)
a Malthusian epoch, (b) an endogenous take-o⁄ from Malthusian stagnation that is associated with an acceleration in
technological progress and is accompanied initially by a rapid increase in population growth, and (c) a rise in the demand
for human capital, followed by a demographic transition and sustained economic growth.
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Figure 4. The Evolution of Technology, gt; Education, et;and E⁄ective Resources, xt :
Small Population.
Notes: The top panel describes the evolution of education et and the rate of technological change gt for a
constant small population L: The curve labeled gt+1 = g(et;L) shows the e⁄ect of education on the growth
rate of technology. The curve labeled et+1 = e(gt+1) shows the e⁄ect of expected technological change on
optimal education choices. The point of intersection between the two curves is the globally stable steady-state
equilibrium (0;gl(L)): In early stages of development, the economy is in the vicinity of this steady-state
equilibrium where education is zero and the rate of technological progress is slow.
The bottom panel describes the evolution of education et and e⁄ective resources per worker xt for a constant
small population, L: The EE locus is the set of all pairs (et;xt;L); for which education is constant over
time. The XX locus is the set of all pairs (et;xt;L); given gt; for which e⁄ective resources per worker are
constant over time. The point of intersection between the two curves is a unique globally stable steady-state
equilibrium. In early stages of development, the system is in the vicinity of this conditional Malthusian steady-
state equilibrium. The Conditional Malthusian Frontier is the set of all pairs (et;xt;L); given gt; below which
the subsistence constraint is binding.
20Over time, the slow growth in population that takes place in the Malthusian Regime raises the
rate of technological progress and shifts the g(et;L) locus in Figure 4 su¢ ciently upward, generating a
qualitative change in the dynamical system, as depicted in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. The Evolution of Technology, gt; Education, et;and E⁄ective Resources, xt :
Moderate Population.
Notes: The top panel describes the evolution of education et and the rate of technological change gt; once the size
of the population has grown to reach a moderate size, L. The system is characterized by multiple steady-state
equilibria. The steady-state equilibria (0;gl(L)) and (eh(L);gh(L)) are locally stable, whereas (eu(L);gu(L))
is unstable. Given the initial conditions, in the absence of large shocks the economy remains in the vicinity of
the low steady-state equilibrium (0;gl(L)); where education is still zero but the rate of technological progress
is moderate.
The bottom panel describes the evolution of education et and e⁄ective resourcess per worker xt for a constant
small population, L:
The dynamical system of education and technology, for a moderate population, is characterized
21by multiple, history-dependent, stable steady-state equilibria: The steady-state equilibria (0;gl(L)) and
(eh(L);gh(L)) are locally stable, whereas (eu(L);gu(L)) is unstable. Given the initial conditions, in
the absence of large shocks the economy remains in the vicinity of the low steady-state equilibrium
(0;gl(L)); where education is still zero but the rate of technological progress is moderate. These steady-
state equilibria correspond to multiple locally stable conditional Malthusian steady-state equilibria,
depicted in Figure 5: a Malthusian steady state, characterized by constant resources per capita, slow
technological progress, and no education, and a modern growth steady state, characterized by a high
level of education, rapid technological progress, growing income per capita, and moderate population
growth. However, since the economy starts in the vicinity of the Malthusian steady state, it remains
there.36
As the rate of technological progress continues to rise in reaction to the increasing population
size, the g(et;L) locus shifts upward further and ultimately, as depicted in Figure 6, the dynamical
system experiences another qualitative change. The Malthusian steady-state equilibrium vanishes, and
the conditional dynamical system is characterized by a unique globally stable modern steady-state
equilibrium (eh(L);gh(L)) with high levels of education and technological progress. The increase in the
pace of technological progress has two opposing e⁄ects on the evolution of population. On the one hand,
it eases households￿budget constraints, allowing the allocation of more resources for raising children.
On the other hand, it induces a reallocation of these additional resources toward child quality. In the
Post-Malthusian Regime, due to the limited demand for human capital, the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates and
the rise in real income permits households to increase their family size as well the quality of each child.37
The interaction between investment in human capital and technological progress generates a virtuous
circle: human capital formation prompts faster technological progress, further raising the demand for
human capital, inducing further investment in child quality, and ultimately, as the economy crosses the
Malthusian frontier, triggering a demographic transition. The o⁄setting e⁄ect of population growth
on the growth rate of income per capita is eliminated and the interaction between human capital
36Large shocks to education or technological progress would permit the economy to jump to the Modern Growth steady
state, but this possibility appears inconsistent with the evidence.
37Literally, income per capita does not change during the Post-Malthusian Regime. It remains ￿xed at the subsistence
level. This is an artifact of the assumption that the only input into child (quality and quantity) is parental time, and that
this time input does not produce measured output. If child rearing, especially the production of quality, requires goods or
if the time required to raise children can be purchased in the market (e.g., schooling), then the shift towards higher child
quality that takes place during the post-Malthusian Regime would be re￿ected in higher market expenditures (as opposed
to parental time expenditures) and rising measured income.
22accumulation and technological progress permits a transition to a state of sustained economic growth.
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Figure 6. The Evolution of Technology, gt; Education, et;and E⁄ective Resources, xt :
Large Population.
Notes: The top panel describes the evolution of education et and the rate of technological change gt once the size
of the population grows to a high level, L: The system is characterized by a unique globally stable steady-state
equilibrium (eh(L);gh(L)). In mature stages of development, the economy converges monotonically to this
steady state with high levels of education and technological progress.
The bottom panel describes the evolution of education et and the rate of technological change xt; once the size
of the population has reached a high level, L: The dynamical system changes qualitatively and the conditional
Malthusian steady state vanishes. The economy evolves through a Post-Malthusian Regime until it crosses the
Conditional Malthusian Frontier, converging to the Modern Growth regime.
In the Modern Growth Regime, resources per capita rise, as technological progress outpaces
population growth. Provided that population size converges to a constant level, the levels of education
and technological progress and the growth rates of resources per capita and thus output per capita are
23constant in the modern growth steady-state equilibrium.
2.7 Complementary Mechanisms
The emergence of human capital formation and its impact on the demographic transition and the
technological frontier is a central force in the transition from the Post-Malthusian Regime to the state
of sustained economic growth in uni￿ed theories of economic growth in which population, technology
and income per capita are endogenously determined.
Various complementary mechanisms that generate or reinforce the acceleration in technological
progress, the rise in human capital formation, and the onset of the demographic transition have been
proposed and examined quantitatively. They have demonstrated that Uni￿ed Growth Theory can be
augmented and forti￿ed by additional characteristics of the transition from stagnation to growth without
altering the fundamental hypothesis regarding the central role played by technological acceleration, the
emergence of human capital formation, and the demographic transition in this process.
Sources of the Rise in the Demand for and the Formation of Human Capital. The rise in
the demand for human capital, and thus the formation of human capital, is attributed by Galor and
Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2002) to the acceleration in technological progress, underlying the
role of educated individuals in coping with a rapidly changing technological environment. However, the
link between industrial development and the demand for human capital could have been generated by
various complementary mechanisms without altering the fundamental insights. In particular, the rise in
the demand for human capital could be reinforced by: (a) capital accumulation in a technological en-
vironment characterized by capital-skill complementarity (Goldin and Katz 1998, Fernandez-Villaverde
2001 and Galor and Moav 2004, 2006), (b) the rise in the level of a skilled-intensive industrial technol-
ogy (Doepke 2004), or (c) increased specialization in the production of skilled-intensive goods due to
international trade (Galor and Mountford 2008).
Moreover, while according to Uni￿ed Growth Theory human capital formation is induced directly
by the rise in the demand for human capital, this mechanism could be reinforced by: (a) the rising
incentives of capitalists to support the provision of public education for the masses (Galor and Moav
2006, Galor, Moav and Vollrath 2009) and to establish child labor laws (Hazan and Berdugo 2002 and
Doepke and Zilibotti 2005), (b) an improvement in the health infrastructure and its e⁄ect on individuals￿
capacity to produce and bene￿t from human capital (Galor and Weil 1999, Boucekkine, de la Croix and
Licandro 2003, Cervellati and Sunde 2005, Soares 2005, Tamura 2006, Hazan and Zoabi 2006, Lorentzen,
McMillan and Wacziarg 2008), (c) the evolution of preferences for o⁄spring quality (Galor and Moav
2002),38 or (d) the reduction in the cost of education due to increased population density (Boucekkine,
de la Croix and Peeters 2007).
Triggers of the Demographic Transition. The demographic transition is attributed by Galor and
Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2002) to the rise in the demand for human capital and the inducement
that it prodived to substitute quality for quantity of children. However, the link between industrial
development, technological progress, human capital formation and the demographic transition could
be generated by various complementary mechanisms without altering the fundamental insights. In
38For the e⁄ect of institutions on the evolution of preferences see Bowles (1998).
24particular, the demographic transition could be generated by: (a) female-biased technical change that
increases the opportunity cost of children rearing more than household￿ s income (Galor and Weil 1996),
(b) the decline in bene￿ts from child labor (Hazan and Berdugo 2002, Doepke 2004, Doepke and Zilibotti
2005), (c) the decline in mortality rates and the improvement in health infrastructure (Galor and Weil
1999, Kalemli-Ozcan 2002, Lagerlof 2003, Tamura 2006, Hazan and Zoabi 2006, Birchenall 2007, Bar
and Leukhina 2010), (d) globalization and its e⁄ect on the demand for human capital (McDermott 2002,
and Galor and Mountford 2006, 2008), (e) the evolution of preferences for o⁄spring quality (Galor and
Moav 2002), and (e) the transition from agriculture to industry (Strulik and Weisdorf 2008).39
Engines of technological progress. The rise in the pace of technological progress in early stages of
development is attributed to the inherent Malthusian interaction between population and technology,
whereas its intensi￿cation in later stages of development is linked to the rise in human capital formation.
Alternatively, the acceleration can be generated by a gradual movement from a slow growing agricultural
technology to rapidly evolving industrial technology (Hansen and Prescott 2002), the evolution of mar-
kets (Desmet and Parente 2009), institutions conducive for R&D (Mokyr 2002, Acemoglu et al. 2005,
and Aghion and Howitt 2009), globalization (O￿ Rourke and Williamson 2005, and Galor and Mountford
2006, 2008), or a selection of educated, entrepreneurial individuals in the process of development (Galor
and Moav 2002, and Galor and Michalopolous 2006).
The Transition from Agricultural to Industrial Economy. The structure of the aggregate pro-
duction function and its interaction with technological progress in the uni￿ed theories of Galor and Weil
(2000) and Galor and Moav (2002) re￿ ects implicitly a transition from an agricultural to an industrial
economy that accompanied the transition from stagnation to growth. In early stages of development,
the economy is agricultural (i.e., the ￿xed amount of land is a binding constraint on the expansion of the
economy). Population growth reduces labor productivity since the rate of technological progress is not
su¢ ciently high to compensate for the land constraint. However, as the rate of technological progress
intensi￿es in the process of development, the economy becomes industrial. Technological progress coun-
terbalances the land constraint, the role of land gradually diminishes, and ￿e⁄ective resources￿ are
expanding at a rate that permits sustained economic growth.
An explicit modeling of the transition from agriculture to industry (e.g., Hansen and Prescott
2002, Hazan and Berdugo 2002, Doepke 2004, Galor and Mountford 2008, Galor, Moav and Vollrath
2009, and Mourmouras and Rangazas 2009) does not alter the fundamental insight from the framework
of Galor and Weil. Namely, the acceleration in technological progress and its impact on the demand
for human capital and thus on the decline of population growth is a critical force in the transition
from stagnation to growth.40 As discussed in the next section, a two-sector framework is instrumental
in the exploration of the e⁄ect of international trade on the di⁄erential timing of the transition from
39The quantitative examination of Doepke (2004), Fernandez-Villaverde (2001), and Lagerlof (2006) con￿rms the sig-
ni￿cance of these channels in originating the demographic transition and the shift from stagnation to growth.
40Although the reduced form analysis of the transition from stagnation to growth in Hansen and Prescott (2002) appears
not to rely on human capital formation, it is merely an artifact of the lack of micro-foundations for the critical factors
behind the transition. Unlike Galor and Weil (2000) in which the time paths of technological progress, population growth,
and human capital formation are endogenously determined on the basis of explicit micro-foundations, in Hansen and
Prescott (2002) technological progress is exogenous and population growth is assumed to follow the hump-shaped pattern
that is observed over human history. However, a constant rate of technological progress in the industrial sector (as is
assumed by Hansen and Prescott) is unlikely to be sustainable without human capital formation, and their (assumed)
decline in population growth (as income rises su¢ ciently) is plausibly linked to the rise in the demand for human capital.
25stagnation to growth and the associated phenomenon of the great divergence (Galor and Mountford
2008). Moreover, it would be necessary in order to examine the incentives of land owners to block
education reforms and the development of the industrial sector (Galor, Moav and Vollrath 2009).
2.8 Main Hypotheses
The theory generates several hypotheses about the evolution of population, human capital and income
per capita in the process of development, underlining the role of the inherent interaction between
population and technology in the Malthusian epoch, as well as the formation of human capital and the
associated demographic transition, in the emergence of a state of sustained economic growth.
Uni￿ed growth theory proposes that in early stages of development economies were in the proxim-
ity of a stable Malthusian equilibrium. Technology advanced rather slowly and generated proportional
increases in output and population. The inherent positive interaction between technology and the
size and the composition of the population in this epoch gradually increased the pace of technological
progress. However, due to the adjustment of population, output per capita advanced at a miniscule
rate.41 The slow pace of technological progress in the Malthusian epoch provided a limited scope for
human capital in the production process and parents, therefore, had limited economic incentives to
reallocate resources towards the formation of human capital of their o⁄spring.
The epoch of positive Malthusian feedback between the level of technology and the size and the
composition of the population accelerated the pace of technological progress and permitted ultimately a
gradual take-o⁄ to the Post-Malthusian Regime. Although the expansion of resources was still partially
counterbalanced by the enlargement of population, the delayed adjustment of population permitted the
economy to experience rapid growth rates of income per capita as well as population. The acceleration in
technological progress inevitably raised the demand for human capital in the production process, in order
to cope with the rapidly changing economic environment. The rise in the demand for human capital in
the second phase of industrialization induced the formation of human capital. It generated two opposing
e⁄ects on population growth. On the one hand, it eased households￿budget constraints, allowing the
allocation of more resources for raising children. On the other hand, it induced a reallocation of resources
toward child quality. In the Post-Malthusian Regime, due to the modest demand for human capital, the
￿rst e⁄ect dominated and the rise in real income permitted households to increase the number as well
the quality of their children.
The interaction between investment in human capital and technological progress generated a
virtuous circle: human capital generated faster technological progress, which in turn further raised the
demand for human capital, inducing further investment in child quality, that ultimately triggered a
decline in fertility rates and population growth.42 The onset of the demographic transition reduced
the dilution of the stock of capital and land, enhanced the investment in the human capital of the
population, and altered the age distribution of the population, increasing temporarily the size of the
41See the evidence in Galor (2005) and Ashraf and Galor (2008).
42Quantitative analysis of uni￿ed growth theories by Doepke (2004), Fernandez-Villaverde (2001), Lagerlof (2006),
indeed suggests that the rise in the demand for human capital was a signi￿cant force behind the demographic transition
and the emergence of a state of sustained economic growth. Recent empirical evidence con￿rms the importance of the rise
in the demand for human capital in the second phase of industrialization in the emergence of human capital formation
(Galor 2005). Moreover, recent evidence suggests that human capital formation prior to the process of industrialization
played an important role in technological progress and in the industiral take-o⁄ (Baten and Zanden 2008 and Boucekkine,
de la Croix and Peeters 2007), in triggering the decline in fertility in general (Murtin 2009) and via a substitution of
quality for quantity of children in particular (Becker, Cinnirella and Woessmann 2009).
26labor force relative to the population as a whole. Thus, it enabled economies to convert a larger share of
the fruits of factor accumulation and technological progress into growth of income per capita and paved
the way for the emergence of sustained economic growth.43
3 UGT and Comparative Development
Existing theories of comparative development highlight a variety of proximate and ultimate factors
underlying some of the vast inequities in living standards across the globe. The importance of geo-
graphical, cultural and institutional factors, human capital formation, ethnic, linguistic, and religious
fractionalization, colonialism and globalization has been at the center of a debate regarding the origins
of the di⁄erential timing of transitions from stagnation to growth and the remarkable transformation of
the world income distribution in the last two centuries.44 While theoretical and empirical research has
typically focused on the contemporaneous e⁄ects of such factors or their in￿ uence in giving rise to and
sustaining the disparity in income per capita across the globe, attention has recently been drawn towards
pre-historical factors that have been argued to a⁄ect the course of comparative economic development
from the dawn of human civilization to the modern era.
Uni￿ed Growth Theory sheds light on three aspects of comparative economic development. First,
it generates direct hypotheses about the factors that govern the pace of the transition from Malthusian
stagnation to a state of sustained economic growth and thus the emergence of signi￿cant di⁄erences
in economic development across countries and regions. Second, it suggests that initial biogeographical
conditions that were determined tens of thousands years ago, via their e⁄ect on the composition of
the human population had a persistent e⁄ect on comparative economic development across the globe.
Third, it advances the understanding of the origins of multiple growth regimes and convergence clubs
that are often found in cross-country analysis of economic growth.
Uni￿ed Growth Theory suggests that the development process is fueled by the interaction be-
tween the rate of technological progress and the size and the level of human capital of the population.
In particular, the rate of technological progress is governed by the size and the level of human capital
of the population (i.e., gt+1 = g(et;L)); whereas the level of human capital formation is a⁄ected by the
rate of technological progress (i.e., et+1 = e(gt+1)):
For given initial conditions, (e0;g0), this vital interaction between the rate of technological
progress and the size and the level of human capital of the population is a⁄ected di⁄erentially by a
large number of country-speci￿c characteristics (e.g., biogeographical, cultural, and institutional fac-
tors, as well as public policy and trade). These characteristics a⁄ect the intensity of the positive
43Similarly, uni￿ed evolutionary growth theory suggests that the transition from stagnation to growth is an inevitable
outcome of the e⁄ect of the process of development in the Malthusian epoch on the selection of traits that are complemen-
tary to the growth process, such as higher valuation for child quality (Galor and Moav 2002) and longer life expectancy
(Galor and Moav 2008). Hence, the transition is brought about by a gradual change in the composition of the population
and its e⁄ect on technological progress and human capital formation. It is interesting to note that the non-evolutionary
perspective suggests that the adverse e⁄ect of limited resources on population growth in the Malthusian era delays the
process of development, while the evolutionary theory suggests that the Malthusian constraint generates the necessary
evolutionary pressure for the ultimate take-o⁄.
44The in￿uence of geographical factors has been stressed by Jones (1981), Diamond (1997) and Pomeranz (2000), Gallup
et al. (1998), and Olsson and Hibbs (2005). Institutional factors have been advanced by North (1981), Engerman and
Sokolo⁄ (2000), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2005), Mokyr (2002), Rodrik et al. (2004), Levine (2005), and
Greif (2006). The e⁄ect of ethno-linguistic fractionalization is advocated by Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina et al.
(2003). The impact of sociocultural factors has been highlighted by Weber (1905) and Landes (1998), Barro and McCleary
(2003), Guiso et al. (2006) and Tabellini (2008). Finally, the importance of human capital formation has been underlined
in Uni￿ed Growth Theory and has been demonstrated empirically by Glaeser et al. (2004).
27feedback between population and technology in the Malthusian epoch, the strength of the e⁄ect of hu-
man capital on technological progress in the post-Malthusian era, and the signi￿cance of the impact of
the rise in the demand for human capital (in a rapidly changing technological environment) on the pace
of human capital formation and fertility decline. These country-speci￿c elements generate, therefore,
variation in the pace of the transition from stagnation to growth across countries as well as di⁄erences
in the steady-state levels of income per capita across the globe.
As the two theoretical black boxes of Uni￿ed Growth Theory (i.e., the e⁄ect of the size and
the level of human capital of the population on the rate of technological progress (gt+1 = g(et;L));
and the e⁄ect of the rate of technological progress on human capital formation (et+1 = e(gt+1)) are
opened and ￿lled with additional characteristics that a⁄ect the incentives for and the constraints on
technological innovations and human capital formation, variation in these characteristics across countries
would generate variations in economic development across the globe. Thus, Uni￿ed Growth Theory
provides a fundamental framework that encompasses various forces that have generated variations in the
performance across countries (e.g., the earlier European take-o⁄ and overtaking in the growth process)
and sustained di⁄erences in income per-capita across the globe. In particular, contemporary di⁄erences
in income per capita across the globe can be attributed to the e⁄ect of country-speci￿c biogeographical,
cultural, and institutional characteristics, as well as public policy and trade, on the pace of the transition
from stagnation to growth, the distribution of economies along the development path from stagnation
to growth, and variation in the steady-state levels of income per capita.
Suppose that, as postulated in the basic model, technological progress that takes place between
periods t and t+1 in country i, gi
t+1; depends upon the level of education per capita among the working
generation in period t; ei
t; and the population size in period t, Li
t; as well as on country-speci￿c factors,
￿i
t; that a⁄ect technological progress such as the protection of intellectual property rights, the stock of







where for a su¢ ciently large population size g(0;Li
t;￿i
t) > 0; gj(ei
t;Li
t;￿i




0; j = ei
t;Li
t;￿i
t: Hence, for a su¢ ciently large population size, the rate of technological progress
between time t and t + 1 is a positive (even in the absence of investment in human capital), increasing,
strictly concave function of the size and level of education of the working generation at time t; as well
as country-speci￿c factors that are conducive for technological progress:
For given levels of population and human capital, (ei
t;Li
t); the rate of technological progress is
governed by a number of country-speci￿c characteristics. (a) The level of protection of intellectual
property rights may have an ambiguous e⁄ect on technological progress, re￿ ecting the trade-o⁄ between
the positive e⁄ect of intellectual property rights on the incentive to innovate and its adverse e⁄ect on
the proliferation of existing knowledge across ￿rms.45 (b) The stock of knowledge within a society, and
its rate of creation and di⁄usion may create a platform upon which faster technological innovations
may emerge (Mokyr 2002). (c) The composition of religious groups within a society and their attitude
towards knowledge creation and di⁄usion may a⁄ect the incentive of individuals to innovate and the
rate of proliferation of innovations. (d) The composition of interest groups in society and their incentive
45The optimal level of protection of intellectual property rights may be altered in the process of development, and thus,
countries in di⁄erent stages of development may bene￿t from di⁄erent policies.
28to block or promote technological innovation.46 (e) The level of diversity within a society, as re￿ ected
by the composition of human capital, may provide a wider spectrum of traits that are complementary
to the implementation of advanced technological paradigms, but may reduce cooperation and thus the
e¢ ciency of the production process (Ashraf and Galor 2009). (f) The propensity of a country to trade,
re￿ ecting its geographical characteristics, as well as its trade policy, may foster technological di⁄usion
across nations.
Suppose that, as underlined in the basic model, the level of human capital, hi
t+1; of children of
a member of generation t; is an increasing strictly concave function of their parental time investment
in education, ei
t+1; and a decreasing strictly convex function of the rate of technological progress, gi
t+1:
Suppose further that it is a⁄ected by country-speci￿c characteristics, ￿
i
t; that may a⁄ect the cost of









t is a vector of country-speci￿c characteristics that a⁄ect human capital formation such as the
availability and accessibility of public education, credit markets imperfections, the stock of knowledge
in society, religious composition, the degree of inequality in society, and the distribution of ownership
over factors of production.
Suppose that, as postulated in the basic model, individuals￿preferences in country i are repre-
sented by a utility function, ui
t, de￿ned over consumption above a subsistence level ~ c > 0; as well as
over the quantity and quality of their (surviving) children. Suppose further that there are variations
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where ci
t is the consumption of individual of generation t; ni
t is the number of (surviving) children of
individual of generation t; and hi
t+1 is the level of human capital of each child. As follows from (7),
(9), (26) and (27), investment in education would depend upon the rate of technological progress, gi
t+1;
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t):
Hence, human capital formation would depend upon a number of country-speci￿c factors. (a)
The ability of individuals to ￿nance the cost of education and the forgone earnings associated with
schooling in￿ uence their capability to implement the desirable level of investment in education. (b)
The availability, accessibility, and quality of public education determine the extent of human capital
formation. (c) The degree of credit markets imperfection and inequality in society a⁄ect the extent
of under-investment in education, in the absence of subsidized public education and in the presence
of sizable opportunity cost of education.47 (c) The stock of knowledge in society contributes to the
46Interest groups (e.g., landed aristocracy and monopolies) may block the introduction of new technologies in order to
protect their political power and thus maintain their rent extraction (Olson 1982, Krusell and Rios-Rull 1996, Parente and
Prescott 2000, and Acemoglu et al. 2005).
47See Galor and Zeira (1993).
29productivity of acquisition of human capital. (d) The propensity of a country to trade and its inherent
comparative advantage (re￿ ecting its geographical characteristics, as well as its trade policy) a⁄ect the
skill-intensity in production and thus human capital formation. (e) The degree of investment in human
capital, particularly in societies in which the market reward for human capital is limited in the short-run,
would be in￿ uenced by individual￿ s preferences with respect to educated o⁄spring which may re￿ ect: (i)
cultural attributes, (ii) the composition of religious groups within a society and their attitude towards
education, and (iii) the social status associated with education.
The evolution of technology and education in country i, for a given population size, Li; and












In light of the properties of the functions e(gi
t+1;￿i) and g(ei
t;Li;￿i); this dynamical system
is characterized by two qualitatively di⁄erent con￿gurations, as depicted in Figure 7. For a range of
small population size, depicted in the upper panel of Figure 7, the dynamical system is characterized
by a globally stable (conditional) steady-state equilibrium, (￿ e(Li;￿i;￿i); ￿ g(Li;￿i;￿i)) = (0;gl(Li;￿i)),
where gl(Li;￿i) increases with the size of the population and with country-speci￿c characteristics that
are conducive for technological progress, while the level of education remains unchanged.
The inherent Malthusian interaction between the size of the population and the level of technology
increases gradually the size of population and the rate of technological progress and generates an upward
shift in the curve g(ei
t;Li;￿i): Ultimately, the rise in the rate of technological progress (and thus in the
demand for human capital) increases su¢ ciently and g(ei
t;Li;￿i) crosses the threshold level, ^ g(￿i
t);
above which parental investment in the human capital of their o⁄spring is bene￿cial. The Malthusian
steady-state equilibrium vanishes and the economy takes o⁄ to a state of sustained economic growth,
as depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 8. The economy converges to a globally stable (conditional)
steady-state equilibrium, (eh(Li;￿i;￿i);gh(Li;￿i;￿i)); where eh(Li;￿i;￿i) and gh(Li;￿i;￿i) increase
monotonically with the size of the population and with country-speci￿c characteristics that are conducive
for technological progress and human capital formation.
Thus, variations in country-speci￿c characteristics and their e⁄ect of the interaction between the
rate of technological progress and human capital formation generate a di⁄erential pace of transition
from stagnation to growth across countries and determine the timing of the take-o⁄ (i.e., the time
period in which the rate of technological progress in country i; gl(Li;￿i) exceeds the threshold level of
technological progress, ^ g(￿i), above which investment in human capital is pro￿table) and the variation
in (conditional) long-run steady-state equilibrium (i.e., (eh(Li;￿i;￿i);gh(Li;￿i;￿i))).
The examination of the e⁄ect of country-speci￿c characteristics on comparative economic devel-
opment within the context of Uni￿ed Growth Theory is advanced in the next sections, using several
speci￿c mechanisms that link comparative economic development to country-speci￿c factors that af-
fected variation in the pace of the transition from stagnation to growth and the long-run steady-state
equilibria across the globe.
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Figure 7. The Evolution of Technology, gi
t; and Education, ei
t; in the Development Process of Country i:
Notes: Top panel: In early stages of development, population size is relatively low and the economy is in a
stable (conditional) Malthusian steady-state equilibrium characterized by low level of technological progress,
gl(Li;￿i); and no investment in education.
Bottom panel: As population and the rate of technological progress increase in the course of the positive
Malthusian feedback between population and technology, the curve gi
t+1 = g(ei
t;Li;￿i) shifts gradually upward
and ultimately its vertical intercept crosses the threshold level of technological progress, ^ g(￿i), above which
investment in human capital is pro￿table. The Malthusian steady-state equilibrium vanishes and the economy
takes o⁄ to a (conditional) sustained-growth steady-state equilibrium, (eh(Li;￿i;￿i);gh(Li;￿i;￿i)).
313.1 Variations in Technological Progress
Uni￿ed Growth Theory establishes theoretically and quantitatively that the intensi￿cation of technolog-
ical progress in the process of development and its e⁄ect on human capital formation and the onset of
the demographic transition have been the prime forces in the transition from stagnation to growth and
thus in the divergence in income per capita across regions of the world in the past two centuries. Thus,
country-speci￿c characteristics that have a⁄ected the rate of technological progress, such as the level
of protection of intellectual property rights, the stock of knowledge, the composition of religious and
interest groups, the level of diversity, and the propensity to trade, contributed to the di⁄erential pace
of the transition from stagnation to growth and comparative economic development across the globe.
Consider two economies, A and B; that are identical in all respects, except for country-speci￿c
characteristics that contribute to technological progress. In particular, suppose that the countries are
identical in the characteristics that are conducive for human capital formation (i.e., ￿A = ￿B ￿ ￿) and
thus, as follows from (28), for any given level of technological progress, gt+1; human capital formation
is equal in the two economies. Namely, as depicted in Figure 8,
eA
t+1 = eB
t+1 = e(gt+1;￿); (30)
and the threshold level of the rate of technological progress above which parental investment in human
capital is bene￿cial, ^ g(￿); is equal in the two countries.
Suppose further that country-speci￿c characteristics that are conducive for technological progress,
￿i; i = A;B; are more prevalent in country B: Hence, as depicted in Figure 8, for any given level of
population, L; and human capital, et; the rate of technological progress is higher in country B; i.e.,
gB
t+1 = g(et;L;￿B) > gA
t+1 = g(et;L;￿A): (31)
In the Malthusian regime, as depicted in the upper panel of Figure 8, while income per capita
in the two economies may be equal, for a given level of population, the rate of technological progress
is higher in country B: The steady-state equilibrium level of education and technology in county B
is (0;gl(L;￿B); whereas the level in country A is (0;gl(L;￿A): The inherent Malthusian interaction
between the size of the population and the level of technology in each of the countries increases gradually
the size of population and the rate of technological progress and generates an upward shift in the curves
g(eA
t ;L;￿A) and g(eB
t ;L;￿B): Ultimately, the rate of technological progress in country B increases
su¢ ciently, and as depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 8, it crosses the threshold level of the rate
of technological progress, ^ g(￿); above which parental investment in human capital is bene￿cial. The
(conditional) Malthusian steady-state equilibrium vanishes in country B; and the economy takes o⁄
to a (conditional) sustained-growth steady-state equilibrium (eh(L;￿B;￿);gh(L;￿B;￿)): Country A;
in contrast, experiences a later take-o⁄. Moreover, if the country-speci￿c characteristics of the two
economies do not converge in the long-run, country B will be have a superior steady-state equilibrium.
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Figure 8. Variations in Country-Speci￿c Characteristics that Contribute to Technological Progress
and Comparative Development.
Notes: Top Panel: In early stages of development, prior to the emergence of demand for human capital, the
two economies are in a (conditional) Malthusian steady-state equilibrium. Country B￿ s characteristics, ￿B; are
more conducive for technological progress than those in country A, ￿A; and, for a given population size, its rate
of technological progress, gl(L;￿B); is higher than that in country A, gl(L;￿A).
Bottom Panel: As population and the rate of technological progress increase in the course of the positive Malthu-
sian feedback between population and technology, the curves gB
t+1 = g(eB
t ;L;￿B) and gA
t+1 = g(eA
t ;L;￿A)
shift gradually upward and ultimately the vertical intercept of gB
t+1 = g(eB
t ;L;￿B) crosses the threshold
level of technological progress, ^ g(￿), above which investment in human capital is pro￿table, while the verti-
cal intercept of the curve gA
t+1 = g(eA
t ;L;￿A) remains below this threshold. The Malthusian steady-state
equilibrium vanishes in country B and the economy converges to a sustained-growth steady-state equilibrium,
(eh(L;￿B;￿);gh(L;￿B;￿)), whereas country A still remains in the (conditional) Malthusian steady-state
33equilibrium, (0;gl(L;￿A)):
3.2 Variations in Human Capital Formation
Uni￿ed Growth Theory establishes theoretically and quantitatively that the increase in the pace of tech-
nological progress and its e⁄ect on human capital formation and the onset of the demographic transition
have been the focal forces in the transition from stagnation to growth and thus in the divergence in
income per capita across regions of the world in the past two centuries. Once the technologically-driven
demand for human capital emerged, the prevalence of characteristics conducive for human capital forma-
tion in￿ uenced the swiftness of the process of human capital accumulation, the timing of the demographic
transition, the pace of the transition from stagnation to growth, and thereby the observed distribution
of income in the world economy.48 Thus, country-speci￿c characteristics that a⁄ect human capital
formation, such as the availability and accessibility of public education, credit market imperfections, the
stock of knowledge in society, religious composition, the degree of inequality in society, the distribution
of ownership over factors of production, and the economy￿ s comparative advantage, contributed to the
di⁄erential pace of the transition from agriculture to industry and comparative economic development
across the globe.
Consider two economies, A and B; that are identical in all respects, except for speci￿c charac-
teristics that contribute to human capital formation. In particular, suppose that the two economies
are identical in their country-speci￿c characteristics that are conducive for technological progress (i.e.,
￿A = ￿B ￿ ￿) and thus, as follows from (25), for any given level of population, L, and human capital,
et; the rates of technological progress in countries A and B, as depicted in Figure 9, are equal as well.
Namely, for every (et;L);
gA
t+1 = gB
t+1 ￿ g(et;L;￿): (32)
Suppose further that country-speci￿c characteristics that are conducive for human capital formation,
￿i; i = A;B; are more prevalent in country B; and thus, as follows from (28), and depicted in Figure 9,
for any given level of technological progress, gt+1; human capital formation is at least as high in country
B as it is in country A. Namely,
eA
t+1 = e(gt+1;￿A) ￿ eB
t+1 = e(gt+1;￿B); (33)
and the threshold level of the rate of technological progress above which parental investment in human
capital is bene￿cial is lower in country B, i.e.,








t+1 = 0 if gt+1 ￿ ^ g(￿B);
< eB
t+1 = e(gt+1;￿B) if gt+1 > ^ g(￿B):
(35)
As depicted in the upper panel of Figure 9, prior to the emergence of demand for human capital
the two economies are in the same (conditional) steady-state equilibrium, (0;gl(L;￿)); but country
48Consistent with empirical evidence, the increased demand for human capital has not resulted necessarily in an increase
in the equilibrium rate of return to human capital due to a massive supply response generated by (a) the increase in the
incentive for investment in education, and (b) institutional changes (e.g., the provision of public education) that lowered
the cost of investment in human capital.
34B faces a lower threshold for a take-o⁄ ^ g(￿B) < ^ g(￿A): The positive Malthusian interaction between
the size of the population and the level of technology in each of the countries increases gradually the
size of population and the rate of technological progress and generates an upward shift in the curve
gi
t+1 = g(ei
t;L;￿): In particular, as depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 9, once the rate of technolog-
ical progress increases su¢ ciently and crosses the threshold level of the rate of technological progress,
^ g(￿B), above which parental investment in human capital is pro￿table in country B, while it remains be-
low the corresponding threshold for country A, ^ g(￿A); the Malthusian steady-state equilibrium vanishes
in country B; and the economy takes o⁄ to a (conditional) sustained-growth steady-state equilibrium,
(eh(LB;￿;￿B);gh(LB;￿;￿B)). In contrast, in country A the rise in the demand for human capital is
still insu¢ cient to generate a take-o⁄ and the economy remains temporarily in a (conditional) Malthu-
sian steady-state equilibrium, (0;gl(L;￿)). Moreover, if the country-speci￿c characteristics of the two
economies do not converge in the long-run, country B will be have a superior steady-state equilibrium.
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Figure 9. Variations in Country-Speci￿c Characteristics that Contribute to Human
Capital Formation and Comparative Development.
Notes: Top Panel: Prior to the emergence of demand for human capital the two economies are in the same (con-
ditional) steady-state equilibrium, (0;gl(L;￿)); but since country B￿ s characteristics, ￿B; are more conducive
for human capital formation than those in country A, ￿A; country B faces a lower threshold for a take-o⁄ (i.e.,
^ g(￿B) < ^ g(￿A)).
Bottom Panel: As population and the rate of technological progress increase in the course of the positive
Malthusian feedback between population and technology, the curve gi
t+1 = g(ei
t;L;￿); i = A;B; shifts grad-
ually upward and ultimately its vertical intercept crosses the threshold level of technological progress, ^ g(￿B),
above which investment in human capital in country B is pro￿table, while it remains below the corresponding
threshold for country A, ^ g(￿A). The Malthusian steady-state equilibrium vanishes in country B and the
economy takes o⁄ to a (conditional) sustained-growth steady-state equilibrium, (eh(L;￿;￿B);gh(L;￿;￿B)),
while country A remains temporarily in a (conditional) Malthusian steady-state equilibrium, (0;gl(L;￿)):
36The Emergence of Human Capital Promoting Institutions. While the process of industrializa-
tion raised the importance of human capital in the production process, re￿ ecting its complementarity
with technology in a rapidly changing technological environment, human capital accumulation has not
bene￿ted all sectors of the economy. Inequality in the ownership of factors of production has generated
an incentive for better endowed agents to block the implementation of institutional changes and policies
that promote human capital formation, resulting in a suboptimal level of investment in human capital
from a growth perspective.
As argued by Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009), the transition from an agricultural to an industrial
economy changed the nature of the main economic con￿ ict in society. Unlike the agrarian economy,
which was characterized by a con￿ ict of interests between the landed aristocracy and the masses, the
process of industrialization has brought about an additional con￿ ict between the entrenched landed
elite and the emerging capitalist elite. In light of a lower degree of complementarity between human
capital and land, education has increased the productivity of labor in industrial production more than
in agricultural production, inducing rural-urban migration and thus a decline in the rental rate. Thus,
while industrialists have had a direct economic incentive to support education policies that would foster
human capital formation (Galor and Moav 2006), landowners, whose interests lay in the reduction of
the mobility of the rural labor force, have favored policies that deprived the masses from education, as
long as their stake in the productivity of the industrial sector was insu¢ cient.49
The adverse e⁄ect of the implementation of public education on landowners￿income from agricul-
tural production is magni￿ed by the concentration of land ownership, and thus, as long as landowners
a⁄ected the political process and thereby the implementation of growth-enhancing education policies, in-
equality in the distribution of land ownership has been a hurdle for human capital accumulation, slowing
the process of industrialization and the transition to modern growth. Economies in which land has been
more equally distributed have implemented earlier public education campaigns and have bene￿ted from
the emergence of a skilled-intensive industrial sector and a rapid process of development. In contrast,
among economies marked by a more unequal distribution of land ownership, land abundance that was
a source of richness in early stages of development has led in later stages to under-investment in human
capital, an unskilled-intensive industrial sector, and a slower growth process. Thus, variations in the
distribution of land ownership across countries, which could potentially be mapped into di⁄erences in
geographical conditions across the globe, have contributed to disparity in the industrial composition of
the economy, and thereby to divergent development patterns across the globe.50
This hypothesis is consistent with evidence by Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009) that suggests that
indeed the distribution of land ownership has a⁄ected the nature of the transition from an agrarian to an
industrial economy and has been signi￿cant in the emergence of sustained di⁄erences in human capital
49Landowners may bene￿t from the economic development of other segments of the economy due to capital ownership,
labor supply to the industrial sector, the provision of public goods, and demand spillovers from economic development of
the urban sector.
50Sokolo⁄ and Engerman (2002) and Acemoglu et al. (2005) underline the role of the con￿ict between the elite and the
masses in the delay in the implementation of growth enhancing educational policies. In contrast to this con￿ict-based
political mechanism, Galor and Moav (2006) and Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009) emphasize a direct economic mechanism
(i.e., the adverse e⁄ect of education reforms on the land rental rate) that governs the relationship between inequality and
the process of development. Unlike the analysis Engerman and Sokolof and Acemoglu et al. that implies the perpetual
desirability of extractive institutions for the ruling elite, Galor, Moav and Vollrath demonstrate that, even if the political
structure in the economy remains unchanged, economic development and a gradual diversi￿cation of the assets held by
the landed aristocracy will ultimately trigger the implementation of growth-promoting education policies, once the stake
of the landed aristocracy in the e¢ cient operation of the industrial sector dominates their overall economic interest.
37formation and growth patterns across countries. Moreover, the adverse e⁄ect of the concentration of
land ownership on education expenditure is con￿rmed empirically by Galor, Moav and Vollrath based
on variation in the concentration of land ownership and public expenditure on education across states
in the USA during the period 1990-1940.
This theory can be integrated into the framework of Uni￿ed Growth Theory. Consider two
economies, A and B; that are identical in all respects, except for concentration in landownership. Sup-
pose further that the concentration in land ownership is larger in country A, and thus, the concentration
of land ownership in country B is more conducive for human capital formation. As depicted in Figure
9, for any given level of technological progress, gt+1; human capital formation is at least as high in
country B (i.e., eA
t+1 = e(gt+1;￿A) ￿ eB
t+1 = e(gt+1;￿B)) as it is in country A; and the threshold level
of the rate of technological progress above which parental investment in human capital is bene￿cial is
lower in country B (i.e., ^ g(￿B) < ^ g(￿A)): The process of development and the inherent Malthusian
interaction between the size of the population and the level of technology in particular increase gradually
the rate of technological progress and generate an upward shift in the curve g(ei
t;L;￿): In particular,
since ^ g(￿B) < ^ g(￿B); country B experiences an earlier process of human capital formation and a faster
transition to a state of sustained economic growth. However, if the e⁄ect of the concentration of land
ownership on human capital formation dissipates, as the share of the agricultural sector declines, the
two economies would converge to the same long-run steady-state equilibrium.
Globalization and Divergence. The dramatic transformation in the distribution of income and
population across the globe in the past two centuries is one of the most signi￿cant mysteries in the
growth process. Some regions have excelled in the growth of income per capita while other regions have
been dominant in population growth.51 This striking contrast between the development paths of large
subsets of the world economy gives rise to fundamental questions about the determinants of economic
growth in an interdependent world. Notably, has the pace of transition to sustained economic growth
in advanced economies adversely a⁄ected the process of development in less developed economies? and
have the forces of international trade contributed to the divergence in the timing of the demographic
transition and the emergence of sustained economic growth across countries?
Galor and Mountford (2006, 2008) suggest that international trade has played a signi￿cant role
in the di⁄erential timing of demographic transitions across countries and has been a major determinant
of the distribution of world population and the divergence in income per capita across countries in the
last two centuries.52 The research suggests that international trade has an asymmetrical e⁄ect on the
evolution of industrial and non-industrial economies. While in the industrial nations the gains from
trade have been directed primarily towards investment in education and growth in output per capita, a
greater portion of the gains from trade in non-industrial nations has been channeled towards population
growth. In contrast to the existing literature on the dynamics of comparative advantage,53 the theory
suggests that even if trade equalizes the growth of total output in the trading countries (due to the
terms of trade e⁄ect), income per capita of developed and less developed economies will diverge, since
51In the time period 1820-1998, the ratio between income per capita in Western Europe and Asia grew nearly three fold,
whereas the ratio between the Asian population and the Western European population grew nearly two fold (Maddison
2001).
52See also Krugman and Venables (1995), Baldwin et al. (2001), and O￿ Rourke and Williamson (2005).
53See Findlay and Kierzkowsky (1983), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Stokey (1991), Young (1991), Matsuyama (1992),
among others.
38in developed economies the growth of total output will be generated primarily by an increase in output
per capita, whereas in less developed economies the contribution of population growth to the growth of
total output will be more signi￿cant.
The expansion of international trade enhanced the specialization of industrial economies in the
production of industrial, skilled intensive, goods. The associated rise in the demand for skilled labor
has induced a gradual investment in the quality of the population, expediting a demographic transition,
stimulating technological progress and further enhancing the comparative advantage of these indus-
trial economies in the production of skilled intensive goods. In non-industrial economies, in contrast,
international trade has generated an incentive to specialize in the production of unskilled intensive, non-
industrial, goods. The absence of signi￿cant demand for human capital has provided limited incentives
to invest in the quality of the population and a larger share of their gains from trade has been utilized
for a further increase in the size of the population, rather than the income of the existing population.54
The demographic transition in these non-industrial economies has been signi￿cantly delayed, increasing
further their relative abundance of unskilled labor, enhancing their comparative disadvantage in the
production of skilled intensive goods, and delaying their process of development.
Empirical evidence provided by Galor and Mountford (2008) suggests that indeed international
trade has reinforced the initial patterns of comparative advantage, has generated a persistent e⁄ect on
the distribution of population in the world economy and has contributed to the divergence in income
per capita across countries and regions.55 In particular, cross-country regression analysis supports
the hypothesis that international trade generates opposing e⁄ects on fertility rates and education in
developed and less developed economies. International trade has a positive e⁄ect on fertility and a
negative e⁄ect on human capital formation in non-OECD economies, whereas in OECD economies
trade triggers a decline in fertility and an increase in human capital accumulation.
The theory can be incorporated into the basic framework of Uni￿ed Growth Theory. Consider two
economies, India (country A) and Britain (country B); in the midst of their process of industrialization.
Suppose that the countries are identical in the characteristics that are conducive for human capital
formation (i.e., ￿A = ￿B ￿ ￿) and thus for any given level of technological progress, gt+1; human
capital formation is equal in the two countries. Hence, as depicted in the top panel of Figure 10, for a
given rate of technological progress, gt+1; eA
t+1 = eB
t+1 = e(gt+1;￿); and the threshold level of the rate
of technological progress above which parental investment in human capital is bene￿cial, ^ g(￿); is also
equal in the two countries. Suppose further that the two economies are identical in all other respects,
except for country-speci￿c factors, ￿i; i = A;B; that contribute to a faster technological progress in
Britain. Hence, for any given level of human capital, et; and population size, L; the rate of technological
progress in country B is larger than that in country A (i.e., gB
t+1 = g(et;L;￿B) > gA
t+1 = g(et;L;￿A)).
Moreover, as depicted in Figure 10, the rate of technological progress in the two economies is assumed
54Evidence suggests that the returns to human capital may have been higher in LDCs. One can therefore mistakenly
suppose that incentive to invest in child quality is higher in LDCs. However, these higher rates of return are not applicable
to most individuals. They re￿ect a suboptimal investment in human capital in an environment characterized by credit
market imperfections and limited access to schooling. International trade, therefore, reduces further the modest demand
for human capital and reduces further the incentive to substitute child quality for quantity.
55The adverse e⁄ect of international trade on industrialization and thus on the timing of the demographic transition
could have been mitigated by the positive e⁄ect of trade on technological di⁄usion across countries. Nevertheless, since
the rate of technological di⁄usion depends upon the appropriateness of factor endowments in the receiving country, the
adverse e⁄ect of trade on the factor endowment of less developed economies would slow down the rate of technological
di⁄usion.
39to be above the threshold that justi￿es investment in human capital, but a decline in fertility has not
yet occurred in the two economies.56
Suppose that international trade is established between India and Britain. Trade induces the
technologically advanced economy, Britain, to specialize in the production of industrial skilled intensive
goods, increasing the demand and thus the return to human capital, whereas India specializes in the
production of unskilled intensive, primary goods, decreasing the return to investment in human capital.
International trade generates, therefore, an asymmetric e⁄ect on demand for human capital in the two
countries as captured by the parameters ￿i;i = A;B: For any given level of technological progress,
gt+1; and human capital, et; investment in child quality increases (relative to autarky) in Britain (i.e.,
eB
t+1 = e(gt+1;￿B) > e(gt+1;￿)) and decreases in India (i.e., eA
t+1 = e(gt+1;￿A) < e(gt+1;￿)). As
depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 10, the curve eA
t+1 = e(gt+1;￿A) represents therefore an leftward
shift relative to the autarkic position, e(gt+1;￿), whereas the curve eB
t+1 = e(gt+1;￿B)) represents a
rightward shift relative to the autarkic position, e(gt+1;￿). Thus, international trade intensi￿es human
capital formation in Britain, leading to an earlier demographic transition and an earlier transition to a
state of sustained economic growth. In contrast, international trade decelerates human capital formation
in India, delaying its demographic transition and its transition to a state of sustained economic growth.
Furthermore, if the asymmetric e⁄ects of international trade on human capital formation in the two
economies persist, India will experience an inferior long-run equilibrium relative to Britain.
56As elaborated in section 2, initially the income e⁄ect with respect to fertility dominates and population size as well
as quality jointly increase.
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Figure 10. Asymmetric E⁄ects of International Trade on Human
Capital Formation and the Growth Process.
Notes: Top Panel: Prior to the emergence of international trade, the rate of technological progress in the
two economies is above the threshold that justi￿es investment in human capital, but a decline in fertility has
not yet occurred in either of the two. Country B￿ s characteristics, ￿B; are more conducive for technological
progress than those in country A, ￿A; and thus, for any given level of population size, L; and human capital,
et; the rate of technological progress in country B, gB
t+1 = g(et;L;￿B); is higher than that in country A;
gA
t+1 = g(et;L;￿A): However, the countries are identical in the characteristics that are conducive for human
capital formation (i.e., ￿A = ￿B ￿ ￿) and for any given level of technological progress, gt+1; human capital
formation, ei
t+1 = e(gt+1;￿); is equal in the two countries.
Bottom Panel: International trade generates asymmetric e⁄ects, ￿i;i = A;B; on demand for human capital and
hence on the incentive to invest in human capital in the two countries: It induces the technologically advanced
economy, B, to specialize in the production of industrial skilled intensive goods, increasing its demand for human
capital, while inducing country A to specialize in the production of unskilled intensive goods, decreasing its
41demand for human capital. For any given level of technological progress, gt+1; and investment in child quality, et;
the curve eA
t+1 = e(gt+1;￿A) represents therefore an leftward shift with respect to ei
t+1 = e(gt+1;￿), whereas
the curve eB
t+1 = e(gt+1;￿B) represents a rightward shift with respect to ei
t+1 = e(gt+1;￿). International
trade intensi￿es human capital formation in country B, leading to an earlier demographic transition and an
earlier transition to a state of sustained economic growth. In contrast, international trade decelerates human
capital formation in country A delaying its demographic transition and its transition to a state of sustained
economic growth. If the asymmetric e⁄ects of international trade on human capital formation in the two













B))), even if the variation in the factors
that contribute to technological progress dissipates.
3.3 Persistence of Deeply Rooted Biogeographical Factors
The development of Uni￿ed Growth Theory was fueled by the conviction that the understanding of the
contemporary growth process would be fragile and incomplete unless growth theory would re￿ ect the
principal driving forces over the entire growth process and thus would capture the central role of deeply
rooted, historical, and pre-historical factors in contemporary comparative development.
The Out of Africa Hypothesis and Comparative Development. Recent advances in the spirit of
Uni￿ed Growth Theory suggest that variation in deeply rooted biogeographical factors is critical for the
understanding of the course of comparative economic development from the dawn of human civilization
to the modern era. Ashraf and Galor (2009) demonstrate that biogeographical factors, determined tens
of thousands of years ago, have generated a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the course of economic development
across countries and regions of the world. In particular, they advance and empirically test the hypothesis
that migratory distance from the geographical origin of Homo sapiens in East Africa has generated a
persistent e⁄ect on the global patterns of economic development.
The theory suggests that in the course of the exodus of humans out of Africa variation in mi-
gratory distance generated heterogeneity in the degree of genetic diversity across societies, which had
a long-lasting e⁄ect on the pattern of comparative development. The hypothesis rests on the interplay
between two con￿ icting e⁄ects of diversity on the development process. On the one hand, diversity may
disrupt the socioeconomic order. It increases the likelihood of miscoordination and distrust between
economic agents, and reduces the cooperation among them. Thus diversity operates towards a reduc-
tion in total factor productivity, inhibiting the ability of society to operate e¢ ciently with respect to its
production possibility frontier. On the other hand, a wider spectrum of traits is more likely to contain
the ones that are more complementary to the development and successful implementation of advanced
technological paradigms. Greater heterogeneity therefore fosters the ability of a society to incorporate
more sophisticated and e¢ cient modes of production, expanding the society￿ s production possibility
frontier and conferring the social bene￿t of increased total factor productivity.
Thus, if the bene￿cial productivity e⁄ects of diversity dominate at lower levels of diversity and
the detrimental e⁄ects dominate at higher levels (i.e., if the marginal bene￿ts of diversity as well as
homogeneity are diminishing), there exists an inverted U relationship between diversity and development
outcomes. Furthermore, the optimal level of diversity increases in the process of industrialization, as the
bene￿cial forces associated with greater diversity intensify in an environment characterized by a more
42rapid technological progress.57
Ashraf and Galor (2009) ￿nd that indeed genetic diversity has a non-monotonic e⁄ect on devel-
opment outcomes, re￿ ecting the economic trade-o⁄associated with diversity within a society. While the
intermediate level of genetic diversity prevalent among the Asian and European populations has been
conducive for development, the high degree of diversity among African populations and the low degree
of diversity among native American populations have been a detrimental force in the development of
these regions.
The theory can be embedded in the framework of Uni￿ed Growth Theory. Consider two economies,
A and B; that are identical in all respects, except for the diversity of the human capital of their popu-
lations. In particular, suppose that the countries are identical in the characteristics that are conducive
for human capital formation (i.e., ￿A = ￿B ￿ ￿); and, as established in (28), and depicted in Figure
11, for any given level of the rate of technological progress, gt+1; human capital formation is equal in the
two countries (i.e., eA
t+1 = eB
t+1 = e(gt+1;￿)): Moreover, the threshold level of the rate of technological
progress above which parental investment in human capital is bene￿cial, ^ g(￿); is also equal in the two
countries.
Suppose that, in light of the trade-o⁄ associated with diversity, there exists an optimal level of
diversity, ￿￿
t = ￿(gt); in each period t: Furthermore, since the bene￿ts associated with diversity increase
in an environment characterized by a more rapid technological progress, the optimal level of diversity
is an increasing function of the rate of technological progress, i.e., ￿0(gt) > 0: Suppose further that, as
long as the rate of technological progress in country B is below a critical level, ~ g (where ~ g < ^ g(￿)); the
level of diversity in country B; ￿B, exceeds the optimal level (i.e., ￿B > ￿(gt) for all gt < ~ g), and the
lower level of diversity present in country A; ￿A; is more conducive for technological progress. However,
once the rate of technological progress in country B exceeds the critical level, ~ g; the level of diversity in
country B is more conducive for technological progress than that in country A:







t+1 = g(et;L;￿A) if gl(L;￿B) < ~ g;
> gA
t+1 = g(et;L;￿A) if gl(L;￿B) > ~ g:
(36)
In the Malthusian regime, as depicted in the upper panel of Figure 11, while incomes per capita in
the two economies may be equal, the rate of technological progress is higher in country A: In particular,
for a given level of population, the steady-state equilibrium levels of education and technology in county
B are (0;gl(L;￿B)); while the levels in country A are (0;gl(L;￿A)); where gl(L;￿A) > gl(L;￿B):
The inherent Malthusian interaction between the size of the population and the level of tech-
nology in each of the countries increases gradually the size of population and the rate of technological
progress and generates and upward shift in the curves g(et;L;￿B) and g(et;L;￿A): Inevitably, the rate
of technological progress in country B increases su¢ ciently and crosses threshold level of the rate of tech-
nological progress, ~ g; above which the level of diversity in country B is more conducive for technological
progress than the level of diversity in country A. Technological progress accelerates in country B; due to
the scale e⁄ect, as well as the diversity e⁄ect, and, for a given population size, the rate of technological
progress in country B is higher than that of country A: Ultimately each of the two economies, in its own
pace, crosses the critical level of technological progress, ^ g(￿); above which parental investment in human
57As established by Ashraf and Galor (2007) cultural rather than genetic diversity may generate a similar pattern.
43capital is bene￿cial. The Malthusian steady-state equilibrium vanishes in the two economies and they
take o⁄ to a state of sustained economic growth. During this development process, country B; because
of its more e¢ cient level of diversity, overtakes country A and converges to a superior (conditional)
steady-state equilibrium (eh(L;￿B;￿);gh(L;￿B;￿)) > (eh(L;￿A;￿);gh(L;￿A;￿)):
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Figure 11. Diversity and Comparative Development.
Notes: Top Panel: In early stages of development, prior to the emergence of demand for human capital, the two
economies are in a (conditional) Malthusian steady-state equilibrium. Country B￿ s level of diversity, ￿B; is less
conducive for technological progress than that in country A, ￿A; and for a given population size, L; its rate of
technological progress, gl(L;￿
B); is lower than that in country A, gl(L;￿
A).
Bottom Panel: As population and the rate of technological progress increase in the course of the positive Malthu-
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44of technological progress, ~ g, above which the level of diversity in country B is more conducive for technological
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above which investment in human capital is pro￿table. The Malthusian steady-state equilibrium vanishes in
country B, as well as in country A, and the economies take o⁄ to a state of sustained economic growth. During










The Neolithic Revolution and Comparative Development. The in￿ uential thesis of Diamond
(1997) suggests that contemporary di⁄erences in economic development could be traced to biogeograph-
ical factors that led to regional variation in the timing of the Neolithic Revolution. He argues that
the Neolithic Revolution conferred a developmental head-start to societies that experienced an earlier
transition from primitive hunting and gathering techniques to the more technologically advanced agri-
cultural mode of production. Favorable biogeographic endowments that contributed to the emergence
of agriculture gave some societies the early advantage of operating a superior production technology
and generating resource surpluses and permitted the establishment of a non-food-producing class whose
members were crucial for the development of written language and science, and for the formation of
cities, technology-based military powers, and nation states. The early dominance of these societies sub-
sequently persisted throughout history, being further sustained by geopolitical and historical processes
such as colonization.
Recent empirical evidence suggests that the Neolithic Revolution has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on eco-
nomic development in the pre-industrial world (Ashraf and Galor 2008), and through its impact on
technological, institutional, and cultural factors, on contemporary economic development (Olsson and
Hibbs 2005, Putterman (2008) and Ashraf and Galor 2009). Moreover, Galor and Moav (2008) ￿nd
that socioeconomic changes that were associated with the Neolithic Revolution ￿the transition from
hunter-gatherer tribes to sedentary agricultural communities ￿triggered an evolutionary process that
had a signi￿cant impact on contemporary mortality from infectious diseases and human longevity. Ex-
ploiting an exogenous source of variation in the time elapsed since the ancestors of the population of each
country today experienced the Neolithic Revolution, every 1000 years of earlier Neolithic transition are
estimated to contribute about two years to contemporary life expectancy, accounting for geographical
characteristics, as well as for income, education and health expenditure per capita. Hence, once the
demand for human capital emerged in the process of industrialization, variation in the timing of the
Neolithic Revolution across regions of the world could have contributed to existing variation in human
capital formation and economic development across the globe.
This theory can be integrated into the framework of Uni￿ed Growth Theory. Consider two
economies, A and B; that are identical in all respects, except for the time period in which the ancestors of
their current population experienced the Neolithic Revolution, ￿i; i = A;B: Suppose that the Neolithic
Revolution occurred earlier in country B; and thus, as follows from (28), and depicted in Figure 9, for
any given level of technological progress, gt+1; human capital formation is at least as high in country
B as it is in country A (i.e., eA
t+1 = e(gt+1;￿A) ￿ eB
t+1 = e(gt+1;￿B)); and the threshold level of the
rate of technological progress above which parental investment in human capital is bene￿cial is lower
in country B (i.e., ^ g(￿B) < ^ g(￿A)): Suppose further that an earlier onset of the Neolithic Revolution
45is conducive for technological progress and thus ￿B > ￿A: Hence, as follows from (25) and depicted in
Figure 8, for any given level of population, L; and human capital, et; the rate of technological progress
is higher in country B (i.e., gB
t+1 = g(et;L;￿B) > gA
t+1 = g(et;L;￿A)):
In the Malthusian regime, while income per capita in the two economies may be equal, the rate of
technological progress is higher in country B: As depicted in Figure 8, for a given level of population, the
(conditional) steady-state equilibrium level of education and technology in country B is (0;gl(L;￿B));
whereas the level in country A is (0;gl(L;￿A): The inherent Malthusian interaction between the size
of the population and the level of technology in each of the countries, increases gradually the size of
population and the rate of technological progress and generates an upward shift in the curves g(et;L;￿B)
and g(et;L;￿A): Inevitably, the rate of technological progress in country B increases su¢ ciently and
it crosses threshold level of the rate of technological progress, ^ g(￿B), above which parental investment
in human capital is bene￿cial. The Malthusian steady-state equilibrium vanishes in country B and
the economy takes o⁄ to a state of sustained economic growth. In contrast, in country A the pace of
technological progress is slower and it is still insu¢ cient to exceed that higher threshold, ^ g(￿A), that
would generate a take-o⁄. Moreover, as long as the e⁄ect of the Neolithic Revolution on technological
progress and human capital formation persists, country B will have a superior long-run equilibrium.
3.4 Multiple Growth Regimes and Convergence Clubs
The quest for an empirical determination of the forces that have contributed to the existence of multiple
growth regimes and the emergence of convergence clubs, although central for the understating of the
process of development, has not been universally shared by researchers in the ￿eld of economic growth.58
Contributors to the empirical literature on multiple growth regimes have faced an increasing challenge
of motivating their ￿ndings in the context of growth models that are widely perceived as plausible.
The dominating tendency to rationalize and interpret these empirical explorations in the context of
growth models characterized by multiple long-run equilibria, and thus, convergence clubs, based on
initial conditions has been confronted by skepticism that has undermined this important endeavor and
has deprived it from a central place in the growth literature.59 If indeed there exists a threshold level
of development that poor economies ought to surpass in order to join the club of the rich, and if this
threshold is insurmountable in the absence of an exogenous shock, then how did the rich economies in
today￿ s world surpass this threshold in the distant past when their level of development was similar to
the one experienced by those countries that are in poverty traps today?
Uni￿ed Growth Theory provides a fundamental framework of analysis that uncovers the forces
that contributed to the existence of multiple growth regimes and the emergence of convergence clubs.
Furthermore, it sheds light on the characteristics that determine the association of economies with
each of the clubs. The theory suggests that, although the long-run equilibrium may not di⁄er across
economies, di⁄erential timing of take-o⁄s from stagnation to growth would segment economies into three
fundamental regimes that di⁄er in their growth structure: slow growing economies in the vicinity of a
Malthusian regime, fast growing countries in a sustained growth regime, and a third group of economies
58Growth non-linearities and convergence clubs were explored theoretically by Galor and Ryder (1999), Azariadis and
Drazen (1990), Galor (1992), and Galor (1996), and empirically by Durlauf and Johnson (1995), Quah (1997), Durlauf
and Quah (1999), Bloom, Canning and Silva (2003), Fiaschi and Lavezzi (2003), Feyrer (2008), among others.
59A notable exception is Durlauf and Johnson (1995) who provide a broader interpretation that includes, in addition to
multiple long-run equilbria, a world characterized by a unique long-run equilibrium, but di⁄erent stages of development.
46in the transition from one regime to another. Convergence clubs, therefore, may be temporary, and
endogenous forces would permit economies to shift from the Malthusian Regime into the sustained
growth regime. Consistently with contemporary evidence about the existence of multiple growth regimes
and non-linearities in the evolution of growth rates, the di⁄erential pace of transition from stagnation
to sustained economic growth across countries suggests that in any time period in which the transition
has not been completed across the globe, there exists variation in the position of economies along the
distinct phases of development. Economies would be segmented into three fundamental groups. Two
convergence clubs of rich and poor economies and a third group of countries in the transition from one
club to another.60 Importantly, this segmentation does not re￿ ect the long-run steady state of these
economies, as would be implied by models characterized by multiple steady-state equilibria. Rather,
it is a representation of variation in the timing of the escape from a Malthusian trap and thus in the
position of countries along the growth trajectory from Malthusian epoch to sustained economic growth.
In contrast to existing research that links membership in each of the clubs and the thresholds
that permit economies to switch from one club to another, to critical levels of income and human
capital, Uni￿ed Growth Theory suggests that they are in fact associated primarily with critical rates
of technological progress, population growth and human capital formation. The theory suggests that
two major transformations in the growth process determine the thresholds between the club of the
slow growing economies, countries in a transition from one club to another, and the club of the fast
growing economies. The ￿rst threshold is associated with a rapid increase in the rates of technological
progress and population growth, and the second with a signi￿cant rise in human capital formation
along with a rapid decline in population growth. Variations in the levels of income, human capital,
and population growth across countries, in contrast, would not be indicative of these thresholds, and
would only re￿ ect the country-speci￿c characteristics (e.g., geographical factors and historical accidents
and their manifestation in the diversity of institutional, demographic, and cultural factors, as well as in
trade patterns, colonial status, and public policy) rather than the actual stage of development.61
4 Concluding Remarks
Uni￿ed Growth Theory suggests that the inherent Malthusian interaction between the level of technology
and the size and the composition of the population accelerated the pace of technological progress and
ultimately raised the importance of human capital in the rapidly changing technological environment.
The rise in the demand for human capital and its impact on the formation of human capital, as well
as on the onset of the demographic transition, have brought about signi￿cant technological advances
along with a reduction in fertility rates and population growth. It has enabled economies to divert
60Technological leaders largely experience a monotonic increase in the growth rates of their per capita incomes along the
process of development. Their growth is slow in early stages of development, it increases rapidly during the take-o⁄ from
the Malthusian epoch, and it continues to rise, often stabilizing at higher levels in the sustained growth regime. In contrast,
technological followers that made the transition to sustained economic growth more recently experience a non-monotonic
increase in the growth rates of their per capita incomes. Their growth rate is slow in early stages of development and
it increases rapidly during their take-o⁄ from the Malthusian epoch, boosted by the adoption of technologies from the
existing technological frontier. However, once these economies reach the technological frontier, their growth rates drop to
the level of the technological leaders.
61For instance, although during the 18th century education levels were signi￿cantly lower in England than in continental
Europe, England was the ￿rst to industrialize and to take o⁄ towards a state of sustained economic growth. Similarly, the
demographic transition that marked a regime switch to a state of sustained economic growth occurred in the same decade
across Western European countries that di⁄ered signi￿cantly in their income per capita.
47a larger share of the fruits of factor accumulation and technological progress from fueling population
growth towards the advancement in income per capita, and has thus paved the way for the emergence
of sustained economic growth.
Uni￿ed Growth Theory sheds light on three fundamental aspects of comparative economic devel-
opment. First, it identi￿es the factors that have governed the pace of the transition from stagnation to
growth and have thus contributed to the observed worldwide di⁄erences in economic development. Sec-
ond, it uncovers the forces that have sparked the emergence of multiple growth regimes and convergence
clubs, and third, it underlines the persistent e⁄ects that variations in pre-historical biogeographical
conditions have generated on the global composition of human capital and economic development.
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